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This dissertation examines three topics at the intersection of the economics of 
immigration and the economics of education.  First, I study the development of human 
capital among immigrants by evaluating Arizona Proposition 203 (2000) and 
Massachusetts Question 2 (2002), which require public school districts to provide one 
year of Structured English Immersion to English language learner students.  Using a 
difference-in-differences framework, I show that for recent-arrival first-generation 
immigrants, the two initiatives are less effective at developing English language 
proficiency than previous programs, such as Transitional Bilingual Education and 
English as a Second Language.  However, I also show new heterogeneity in relative 
program effectiveness in that second-generation immigrants actually benefit from 
Structured English Immersion. 
In the second chapter, I use unique data from the Current Population Survey on 
education by country of origin to show that the return to foreign education among 
immigrants is 3.3 percent.  This estimate is half the size of estimates from previous 
studies for two reasons.  First, calculating foreign education as the difference between 
total education and domestic education rather than as a function of total education ad 
age at arrival eliminates the upward bias from misattributing domestic education as 
foreign education.  Second, excluding domestic education as an endogenous control 
variable removes the upward bias in the return to foreign education caused by the 
negative correlation between domestic education and foreign education.  The results 
show that foreign education is even less portable to the United States labor market 
than previously thought. 
In the third chapter, I test whether country-level educational expenditures, 
pupil-teacher ratios, and student achievement should be interpreted as measures of 
foreign school quality.  I use the United States Census and the American Community 
Survey to show that the three measures are associated with the return to foreign 
education in expected directions.  However, only educational expenditures are robust 
to accounting for group-level correlations between the wage residuals.  I also show 
that the three measures affect immigrants who never attended school in their countries 
of birth as a falsification test, which suggests that they reflect country-level 
unobservables rather than foreign school quality. 
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CHAPTER 1 
LEARNING ENGLISH THE FAST WAY?  THE RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
STRUCTURED ENGLISH IMMERSION INITIATIVES 
I. Introduction 
In 1998, California voters adopted Proposition 227 to change how K–12 public 
school districts provide instruction to English language learner (ELL) students.1  Two 
years later, Arizona voters passed a similar initiative in Proposition 203, followed by 
Massachusetts voters with Question 2 in 2002.  The initiatives consist of two 
components that were intended to accelerate the development of English language 
proficiency.  The first requires districts to use Structured English Immersion (SEI), 
which provides instruction in an understandable level of English without incorporating 
home languages.2
                                                 
 
1 Equivalent terms are English learner (EL) and limited English proficient (LEP). 
  For example, the authors of California Proposition 227 claim that 
“[y]oung immigrant children can easily acquire full fluency in a new language, such as 
English, if they are heavily exposed to that language in the classroom at an early age” 
(California Secretary of State 1998).  The second component limits the time that ELL 
students can receive SEI to a period not normally to exceed one year, which increases 
the incentive to learn English quickly.  As intended, most ELL students in the three 
initiative states now receive SEI.  However, a key unintended consequence is that 
districts disregard the one year constraint because they are required to provide a 
program that addresses the language needs of ELL students.  In 2005, over 944,000 
students, representing almost one in five ELL students nationwide, received SEI 
subject to state initiatives that are implemented this way (hereafter referred to as SEI 
2 SEI is also sometimes referred to as Sheltered English Immersion. 
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initiatives). 
Do ELL students develop English language proficiency faster with the SEI 
initiatives than with previous programs, such as Transitional Bilingual Education and 
English as a Second Language?  Recent evaluations of California Proposition 227 
have yet to reach a consensus.  Bali (2001) finds that the initiative is more effective in 
Pasadena Unified School District, Gordon and Hoxby (2002) show that it decreases 
student achievement in school-grade level statewide data, and Parrish et al. (2006) find 
little difference in its effectiveness in cross-sectional statewide data and longitudinal 
data from Los Angeles Unified School District.  With such a diversity of empirical 
methods and conclusions, there is a clear need for additional evaluations of the SEI 
initiatives. 
In this paper, I evaluate whether Arizona Proposition 203 and Massachusetts 
Question 2 are more effective at developing English language proficiency than the 
programs used before the initiatives.  I build on the California studies with three 
methodological contributions.  First, I use a difference-in-differences framework that 
compares statewide trends in English language proficiency in Arizona and 
Massachusetts relative to comparable trends in states without the SEI initiative; 
changing the unit of analysis from the district to the state sidesteps the bias from 
endogenous compliance with the initiative at the district level.  Second, I use parent-
reported English speaking ability (ESA) from the 2000 Census and the 2005, 2006, 
and 2007 American Community Survey as the measure of English language 
proficiency, which avoids the psychometric assumptions needed to compare scores 
from different assessments or correct for student habituation to new tests.  Third, I 
estimate the average treatment effects among recent-arrival first-generation 
immigrants and young second-generation immigrants as potential ELL students, which 
avoids the truncation or censoring of English language proficiency due to the 
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exemption of less English language proficient students from assessments and due to 
the exclusion of fluent English proficient students from the sample. 
Contrary to the claims of the electorate, I show that the Arizona and 
Massachusetts SEI initiatives actually decrease the parent-reported English speaking 
ability of recent-arrival first-generation immigrants by 0.12 to 0.15 standard 
deviations.  Based on the average first-year development of English language 
proficiency, the estimates correspond to a developmental delay of 0.43 to 0.73 years of 
school.  Thus, for the majority of ELL students, Arizona Proposition 203 and 
Massachusetts Question 2 are less effective than previous programs, such as 
Transitional Bilingual Education and English as a Second Language.  However, I also 
show that the SEI initiatives increase the parent-reported English speaking ability of 
young second-generation immigrants by 0.06 to 0.18 standard deviations, which 
corresponds to a developmental gain of 0.90 to 2.37 years of schooling.  Thus, a one 
size fits all instructional approach is also inappropriate: the Arizona and Massachusetts 
SEI initiatives accelerate, or at least do not delay, the development of English 
language proficiency for a substantial minority of ELL students.  I speculate that this 
heterogeneity may be due to the greater English language proficiency and the higher 
school quality of young second-generation immigrants due to additional assimilation 
of their immigrant parents. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  In Section II, I describe 
the language instruction educational programs used by districts not subject to the SEI 
initiatives, the adoption and implementation of the SEI initiatives, and the previous 
research on the relative effectiveness of the SEI initiatives.  I then describe the 
identification strategy and empirical framework in Section III.  In Sections IV and V, I 
discuss the results and robustness exercises, respectively.  Lastly, I conclude with the 
policy implications in Section VI. 
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II. Language Instruction Educational Programs and the SEI Initiatives 
A. Language Instruction Educational Programs for ELL Students 
Who are ELL students, and what programs do K–12 public school districts 
provide when they are not subject to the SEI initiatives?  Districts typically determine 
the ELL status of a new student in two steps.  First, the student reports the language(s) 
spoken at home on a home language survey.  Second, if the home language is not 
English, the student takes a state-approved English language proficiency assessment, 
such as the Language Assessment Scales or the Woodcock Johnson Language 
Proficiency Battery.  The student is designated ELL if the test score is less than an 
arbitrary level, such as the 30th or 40th percentile of the test score distribution.  The 
student retains ELL status until a subsequent test score warrants reclassification to 
fluent English proficient status, at which point the student participates fully in 
mainstream instruction. 
The recent rise in immigration, particularly from non-English speaking 
countries, has led to a 60 percent increase in the population of ELL students, from 3.2 
million in 1995 to 5.1 million in 2005 (National Clearinghouse for English Language 
Acquisition and Language Instruction Educational Programs 2008).  In contrast, the 
population of all other students (including fluent English proficient students) was 
roughly constant at 44.3 million over the same period.  The majority of ELL students 
are first-generation immigrants at 53.9 percent, and of this group, 72.9 percent have 
been in the United States for less than five years (Anette M. Zehler, et al. 2003)  The 
remaining 46.1 percent of ELL students are native-born individuals, who are usually 
second-generation immigrants (native-born with at least one foreign-born parent) in 
elementary school. 
Districts typically exercise choice over which language instruction educational 
program they provide to their ELL students.  The diversity of programs is due to the 
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Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965), which provides financial incentives 
to educate ELL students without requiring specific programs.  Subsequent 
reauthorizations changed the incentives for using particular programs, but a consistent 
theme is the mandate to provide some program after the Supreme Court ruled that 
equal resources alone do not provide ELL students with a meaningful education in Lau 
v. Nichols (1974).  At present, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) (U.S. 
Code 2002) sets two objectives for language instruction educational programs: (1) 
English language proficiency and (2) adequate yearly progress in core academic 
content knowledge.  This paper focuses on how K–12 public school districts meet the 
first objective. 
Table 1. Language Instruction Educational Programs 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 English language arts  Other subject areas 
 Language of 
instruction Peer group  
Language of 
instruction Peer group 
English as a 
Second Language English 
All ELL 
students 
 
 
 
English All students 
Structured English 
Immersion 
Understandable 
English 
All ELL 
students 
 
 
 
Understandable 
English 
All ELL 
students 
Transitional 
Bilingual 
Education 
Home language 
to English 
ELL students 
with same home 
language 
 
 
 
Home language 
to English 
ELL students 
with same home 
language 
Source: Adapted from National Clearinghouse For English Language Acquisition and 
Language Instruction Educational Programs (2007). 
The three most common programs are summarized in Table 1.  The first is 
English as a Second Language, which is based on the pedagogical theory that the 
development of English language proficiency requires maximum exposure to the 
English language (Rosalie Pedalino Porter 1996).  The instructional response of this 
program is to provide (1) specific periods of English language arts instruction without 
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using home languages and (2) instruction in other subject areas in mainstream 
classrooms with instruction in English.  The second program, which is based on the 
same pedagogical theory, is SEI.  In this program, ELL students receive instruction in 
an understandable level of English for all subjects, which takes place in self-contained 
classrooms with all ELL students regardless of home language.  The third program is 
Transitional Bilingual Education, which is sometimes referred to as Early-Exit 
Transitional Bilingual Education.  The pedagogical theory of this approach is the 
developmental interdependence hypothesis, which claims that children with low home 
language ability and no English language ability are cognitively unreceptive to 
instruction exclusively in English (James Cummins 1979).  The instructional response 
is to provide instruction in home languages until instruction in English becomes 
accessible through the transfer of general language skills.  The shift in the language of 
instruction is expected to take two to three years and occurs in self-contained 
classrooms with ELL students with the same home language.  Prior to the three SEI 
initiatives, English as a Second Language and Transitional Bilingual Education were 
the two most commonly used programs by K–12 public school districts, with 
Transitional Bilingual Education being more common in elementary school grade 
levels (Diane August and Kenji Hakuta 1997; Anneka L. Kindler 2002). 
It is worth pointing out that there are multiple differences between these 
programs.  SEI differs from Transitional Bilingual Education in the language of 
instruction (understandable English versus home language and English) and the 
composition of the ELL student peer group (any home language versus same home 
language).  SEI differs from English as a Second Language in the difficulty of the 
English used in instruction (understandable versus mainstream) and the composition 
of the peer group (ELL students versus mainstream students).  There may be other 
program differences, such as teacher quality, the use of teacher aides, and class size.  
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Previous evaluations typically compare overall differences in program effectiveness 
rather than the effectiveness of a specific component holding all else equal, which 
makes it difficult to know the true drivers of program effectiveness (Diane August and 
Kenji Hakuta 1997). 
The optimal program is the one that helps districts maximize the educational 
objectives defined in NCLB subject to the district budget constraint.  In Arizona, local 
choice prior to Proposition 203 resulted in 25.3 percent of ELL students receiving 
instruction that incorporated home languages (Anneka L. Kindler 2002).  More direct 
program data from the Arizona Department of Education indicates that 36.7 percent of 
ELL students received Transitional Bilingual Education (Lisa G. Keegan 1999).3
As a consequence of these concerns, some districts are required to use specific 
programs due to interventions by state legislatures.  In 1971, Massachusetts became 
  
There are two reasons why these programs, and locally chosen programs in general, 
may not be optimal programs.  First, scholars have been unable to reach a consensus 
on the relative effectiveness of the programs described above; see August and Hakuta 
(1997) and Rossell and Baker (1996b) for reviews.  Thus, district administrators and 
teachers lack access to objective, consensus-based evidence when they choose which 
programs to provide.  Second, there is an incentive problem for districts to switch to 
better programs.  Tenured teachers may be unwilling to change to more effective 
programs if they are not accountable for the English language proficiency of their ELL 
students and if the change requires costly retraining and recertification. 
                                                 
 
3 This includes K–6 Transitional Bilingual Programs, 7–12 Secondary Bilingual 
Programs, and K–12 Bilingual-Bicultural Programs.  It excludes English as a Second 
Language Programs and Individual Education Programs. 
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the first state to require the use of Transitional Bilingual Education when there are at 
least 20 ELL students with the same home language in a district; all other ELL 
students receive English as a Second Language.4
B. Adoption and Implementation of the SEI Initiatives 
  Thus, prior to the adoption of 
Question 2, 85.3 percent of Massachusetts ELL students in 1999 received instruction 
that incorporates home languages, dramatically more than the 25.3 percent in Arizona 
(Anneka L. Kindler 2002).  The dissimilarity of the program distributions in Arizona 
and Massachusetts prior to the initiatives is useful because it provides two different 
counterfactuals when I estimate the relative effectiveness of the SEI initiatives. 
State legislation is not the only way to override the local choice of a 
suboptimal program, and it is also not the final word on the issue.  Of the 24 states that 
allow voters to set policy through the initiative process, three used it to require K–12 
public school districts to provide ELL students (1) with SEI (2) for a period not 
normally to exceed one year.  California adopted Proposition 227 with 60.9 percent of 
the vote in 1998.  In 2000, Arizona followed suit with Proposition 203 with 74.7 
percent of the vote, and in 2002, Massachusetts adopted Question 2 with 68.0 percent 
of the vote.  One other state, Colorado, considered the initiative in 2002 as 
Amendment 31 but rejected it with 56.2 percent of the vote.  The sponsors of the 
initiatives argued that district administrators, teachers, and state legislatures were 
unwilling to do what is best for ELL students, as shown by the “slow” 6.7 percent 
annual transition rate from ELL to fluent English proficient status (Alice Callaghan, 
Ron Unz and Fernando Vega 1998). 
The adoption of the initiatives in three of the four states is due to demographic-
                                                 
 
4 See Rossell and Baker (1996a) for a historical account. 
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driven differences in preferences over the language of instruction.  Robinson, Rivers 
and Brecht (2006) show that people of color and speakers of a second language were 
less likely to support English only language instruction educational programs in the 
2000 General Social Survey.  Furthermore, a California exit poll shows that Hispanic 
voters were 22 percentage points less likely to support Proposition 227 (Valentina A. 
Bali 2008).  These studies show that the parents of ELL students were less likely to 
support the SEI initiatives, but since they make up a small portion of the electorate, it 
is not surprising that the initiatives were adopted in California, Arizona, and 
Massachusetts.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the unique outcome for Colorado 
was due to a large campaign contribution and a series of uniquely effective campaign 
advertisements (Nancy Mitchell 2002). 
How do K–12 public school districts implement the two components of the 
SEI initiatives?  On the first part, most districts in the three initiative states now 
provide SEI.  However, there is substantial variation by state due to the availability of 
waivers for alternative programs.  For example, California Proposition 227 allows a 
parent to file a waiver if the ELL child already knows English, is older than ten years 
old, or has special needs that would be better addressed with a different program.  If 
the waiver is granted by the district, then the ELL student can participate in another 
program provided by the district.  As shown in Figure 1, only about 50 percent of 
California ELL students participated in SEI between 1999 (when the state started to 
collect information on its use) and 2007.  While some parents initiate waivers, many 
are encouraged to do so by district administrators and teachers (Christine H. Rossell 
2003).  This suggests that there is district-level endogenous compliance with the 
initiative.  Indeed, Gordon and Hoxby (2002) and Parrish et al. (2006) show that the 
schools that complied with the initiative have ELL students with higher initial English 
language proficiency and lower shares of ELL students, characteristics that are 
10 
 
associated with ELL students who may be easier to teach. 
 
Figure 1. Program Compliance with the SEI Initiative by State 
In contrast, Arizona and Massachusetts implemented stricter versions of the 
SEI initiative.  Waiver eligibility in Arizona is limited to ELL students who score 
above the 50th percentile of non-ELL test scores (Kate S. Mahoney, Marilyn S. 
Thompson and Jeff MacSwan 2004), which generates compliance rates of 80 to 95 
percent because eligible students already participate in mainstream instruction.  
Compliance rates in Massachusetts are similarly high, with the exception of a handful 
of Two-Way Bilingual Education programs exempted by the state legislature in 2003. 
The second component restricts program participation to a period not normally 
to exceed one year, which is intended to increase the incentive for ELL students to 
learn English quickly.  A key feature of the initiatives in practice is that this 
component is not enforced under guidance from the state departments of education.  
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For example, the California Department of Education (1998) interprets one year as the 
minimum rather than the maximum enrollment in SEI.  Similarly, the Massachusetts 
Department of Education (2006) states that Question 2 may not be interpreted as a 
limit on the time spent participating in SEI.  Three case studies in Massachusetts show 
that districts do interpret one year as the target rather than as a binding constraint 
(Ester J. de Jong, Mileidis Gort and Casey D. Cobb 2005).  The guidelines are 
motivated by federal law that requires K–12 public school districts to provide a 
program to ELL students to address their language needs (1974).  Thus, while ELL 
students are not limited to one year of program participation, they are largely limited 
in only receiving SEI rather than Transitional Bilingual Education or English as a 
Second Language. 
The difference between the adopted initiative and the implemented initiative 
has an important public choice implication.  A common argument in favor of setting 
policy through the initiative process is that if the initiative is adopted, it represents an 
improvement to the median voter (John G. Matsusaka 2005).  State attorneys general 
typically invalidate initiatives that are legally unsound so that those voted on by the 
electorate can actually be implemented.  But in the case of the SEI initiatives, the one 
year restriction was disregarded under the guidance of state departments of education.  
Thus, if voters based their decisions in part on the one year restriction, the 
implemented SEI initiative may not be one that is preferred by the median voter. 
One final issue is the implementation of additional policies following the 
adoption of Arizona Proposition 203.  Like the other two initiative states, the Arizona 
Department of Education recommends that ELL students continue to receive SEI if 
they are not yet fluent English proficient after one year, but legislation in 2006 limits 
state funding for ELL students to two years to encourage districts to develop English 
language proficiency as quickly as possible (Arizona Department of Education 2006).  
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Because the data in this paper only goes through 2007, this funding change does not 
apply to the students in the samples described below.  There are two other policies that 
may affect the development of English language proficiency.  First, Arizona reduced 
the number of course credits for teacher certification in SEI from twenty one to four, 
and second, it doubled funding for ELL course materials and teacher recertification 
expenses (Kate S. Mahoney, Jeff MacSwan and Marilyn S. Thompson 2005).  
Because these two policies were adopted as a consequence of Arizona Proposition 
203, I interpret them as part of the overall effect of the initiative on English language 
proficiency. 
C. Previous Research on the SEI Initiatives 
Previous evaluations focus on California because it was the first state to adopt 
and implement the SEI initiative.  The three studies I discuss in this subsection 
demonstrate the difficulties of evaluating the initiatives and language instruction 
educational programs in general. 
The first evaluation by Bali (2001) estimates the effect of California 
Proposition 227 on ELL student achievement in Pasadena Unified School District.  
The paper shows that reading score deficits on the Stanford Achievement Tests among 
ELL students receiving Transitional Bilingual Education disappear after they are 
subject to the SEI initiative.  The paper is unique in considering the censoring of 
student achievement by modeling test exemptions for less English language proficient 
ELL students with a Heckman selection model.  However, there are some important 
limitations that cast doubt on its conclusion that the SEI initiative accelerated the 
development of English language proficiency relative to Transitional Bilingual 
Education.  While the paper focuses on the left-censoring of the dependent variable, it 
does not consider the truncation on the right due to the exclusion of fluent English 
proficient students from the sample.  In addition, the assumption of exogenous 
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compliance to the initiative is unreasonable because the districts (and schools) that 
comply with California Proposition 227 differ from the average district by having 
more financial resources, greater community support for the initiative, and ELL 
students who are easier to teach. 
A second evaluation by Gordon and Hoxby (2002) estimates the effect of the 
California SEI initiative on school-grade average test scores and shows that it 
decreases language, math, and reading achievement in early grades.  One advantage of 
the paper over Bali (2001) is its coverage of the entire state rather than a particular 
district.  The main specification is a regression of the change in average test scores on 
the change in the share of ELL students who received Transitional Bilingual 
Education.  The paper is unique in addressing endogenous compliance with the SEI 
initiative by instrumenting for the actual change in the Transitional Bilingual 
Education enrollment share with the change in the enrollment share if the district 
mechanically complied with the initiative.  However, the paper suffers from two 
limitations.  First, the paper does not address the truncation of test scores that generate 
the school-grade averages test scores.  Second, the paper imposes strong psychometric 
assumptions to purge the data of habituation bias; California’s switch to the Stanford 
Achievement Test in 1997 means that part of the change in test scores is due to 
students learning how to take the new test rather than any actual change in the quality 
of instruction. 
The third study is the evaluation mandated by the California state legislature.  
Like Bali (2001), Parrish et al. (2006) also study the relative effectiveness of the 
initiative in a specific school district, in this case, Los Angeles Unified School 
District.  Using a value-added methodology, the paper shows little evidence that the 
SEI initiative changed student achievement, but again, this conclusion is not surprising 
given the truncation of the test score data.  In a separate analysis, the authors estimate 
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the relative effectiveness of the initiative using cross-sectional statewide data.  
However, this approach suffers from endogenous compliance with the initiative and 
the truncation of student achievement.  Thus, given these methodological limitations, 
there is still much we do not know the relative effect of the SEI initiative on the 
English language proficiency of ELL students. 
III. Identification Strategy and Empirical Framework 
A. Identification Strategy and Outcome Measure 
The ideal research design to evaluate the SEI initiatives is to randomly assign 
the initiative to districts within a state and compare the English language proficiency 
in districts treated with the initiative with districts not treated with the initiative.  The 
measure of English language proficiency would come from a single assessment that 
students do not “learn” how to take (i.e. no habituation).  Lastly, the sample would 
consist of ELL students and former ELL students and would not exempt less English 
proficient students from the test.  Unfortunately, evaluating the SEI initiatives – and 
language instruction educational programs in general – in practice is difficult for three 
reasons.  First, district-level compliance with the initiative is endogenous.  Second, the 
assessments used to measure English language proficiency differ between states and 
within states over time.  Third, most datasets truncate or censor English language 
proficiency on the left by exempting low English proficient students from taking tests 
and on the right by not testing fluent English proficient students who are no longer 
considered ELL. 
In this paper, I use a straightforward empirical strategy to overcome these 
difficulties.  To address the first concern, I change the unit of analysis from the district 
to the state.  This empirical strategy is useful because the compliance rates in Arizona 
and Massachusetts are high and because endogenous non-compliance by districts will 
only lead to a conservative average treatment effect estimator.  I employ a quasi-
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experimental nonequivalent control group research design in the form of the standard 
difference-in-differences econometric approach.  Arizona and Massachusetts are the 
treatment groups, 2000 is the pre period and 2005, 2006, and 2007 are the post period.  
The control groups in the primary specifications are neighboring states in the Other 
West for Arizona and in the Other Northeast for Massachusetts.5
The second issue of non-comparable measures of English language proficiency 
is due to the changing set of acceptable assessments both between states and within 
states over time.  Rather than standardize scores from different assessments or correct 
for habituation to new tests, I employ an alternative strategy of using parent-reported 
English speaking ability from the Census and American Community Survey as the 
measure of English language proficiency.  Since 1980, the Census and the American 
Community Survey asks household respondents whether each household member 
  I exclude California 
from the Other West control group because the ELL students in the state have partial 
exposure to Proposition 227, and their inclusion would bias the average treatment 
effect estimator toward zero.  The strength of the difference-in-differences framework 
is that it eliminates state-invariant trends such as changes in the composition of ELL 
students due to tightening federal immigration restrictions as part of the War on Terror 
and changes in the behavior of districts, schools, and teachers in response to NCLB.  
The approach also differences out selective emigration if less English language 
proficient immigrants are more likely to return to their home countries. 
                                                 
 
5 The West region consists of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  The 
Northeast region consists of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
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speaks English “at home,” and if not, whether the household member speaks English 
“very well,” “well,” “not well,” or “not at all.”  Since respondents are typically 
parents, I interpret English speaking ability as parent-reported for children and self-
reported for adults. 
The primary concern with parent-reported English speaking ability as a policy 
outcome is that it may not be a meaningful measure of English language proficiency.  
On the one hand, previous studies argue that self-reported English speaking ability is a 
good measure of English language proficiency because it is positively associated with 
immigrant educational attainment, occupational choice, and wages (Hoyt Bleakley and 
Aimee Chin 2004; Sherrie A. Kossoudji 1988; Walter McManus, William Gould and 
Finis Welch 1983).  On the other hand, the measure may capture other aspects of 
human capital that are omitted from the empirical specification.  While there is 
evidence that it proxies for other aspects of English language proficiency, such as 
understanding and writing ability (Anthony P. Carnevale, Richard A. Fry and B. 
Lindsay Lowell 2001; Barry R. Chiswick 1991), self-reported English speaking ability 
may also be associated with unobserved non-language aspects of human capital which 
makes its interpretation difficult.  The best available evidence of its validity is its 
positive correlation with standardized test scores in Census validation studies (Robert 
Kominski 1989).  These studies have led some scholars to use self-reported English 
speaking as a policy outcome when studying the effect of the language of instruction 
received as a child on the self-reported English speaking ability as an adult (Joshua D. 
Angrist, Aimee Chin and Ricardo Godoy 2008).  However, it is difficult to say 
whether household respondents provide inflated or harsher judgments of English 
speaking ability when it comes to their children versus themselves. 
To validate subjective parent-reported English speaking ability as a meaningful 
measure of English language proficiency, I turn to data from the 2003-1 cohort of the 
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New Immigrant Survey.  This survey contains data on immigrants who were recently 
granted legal permanent residence in the United States.  I focus on the subsample of 
adults who were asked the Census and American Community Survey questions on 
English speaking ability and link them to their children who took four tests from the 
Woodcock-Johnson III Tests of Achievement: Letter-Word Identification, Passage 
Completion, Calculation, and Applied Problems.  I am particularly interested in the 
relationship between parent-reported English speaking ability and objective test scores 
from the Letter-Word Identification and Passage Completion tests because as recently 
as 2004, the two tests were part of a battery approved by the Arizona Department of 
Education to assign ELL status to students (Kate S. Mahoney, Jeff MacSwan and 
Marilyn S. Thompson 2005). 
 
Figure 2. Parent-Reported ESA and Woodcock-Johnson III Test Scores 
Figure 2 presents average raw test scores for the four tests at each value of 
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parent-reported English speaking ability.  The top line with the square markers shows 
that children with higher parent-reported English speaking ability also have higher 
Letter-Word Identification test scores.  The line with the circle markers shows a 
similar upward pattern for Passage Completion.  Thus, subjective parent-reported 
English speaking ability is positively associated with two objective measures of 
English language proficiency that districts use to determine ELL status.  It is useful to 
contrast these trends with those of the two math tests.  The line with the triangle 
markers for Calculation shows a weak association with parent-reported English 
speaking ability, and the line with the diamond markers for Applied Problems shows a 
positive relationship with parent-reported English speaking ability.  The trends for the 
two math tests support the conclusion that parent-reported English speaking ability is a 
meaningful measure of English language proficiency because the Calculation test is an 
arithmetic exam in a common mathematical language across countries, and the 
Applied Problems test is a set of word problems that requires English language 
proficiency to complete correctly. 
The trend lines also shed light on the cardinality of parent-reported English 
speaking ability.  Previous studies typically combine the speaks English “at home” 
group with the speaks English “very well” group and then impose a linear 
specification of self-reported English speaking ability, with each additional level 
representing an equal increase in English language proficiency.  The figure shows that 
a linear specification is supported by the data and that the speaks English “at home” 
group can be combined with speaks English “well,” “very well,” or both groups.  In 
this paper, I combine the speaks English “at home” and the speaks English “very well” 
categories and impose a linear specification, although I relax these assumptions in the 
robustness exercise section. 
The third and final methodological concern is the truncation and censoring of 
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English language proficiency.  Districts often exempt the lowest English proficient 
students from assessments tests and stop testing fluent English language proficient 
students, which makes it difficult to find any difference in program effectiveness.6
The second sample consists of young second-generation immigrant children, 
attending K–12 public school, and not living in group quarters.  To unambiguously 
identify second-generation immigrants, I restrict the sample to native-born children 
with two foreign-born parents.  As with recent-arrival first-generation immigrants, I 
limit the sample to children always subject to or never subject to the initiatives.  This 
means that I focus on children between 8 and 11 years old so that they only have 
(roughly) three years of attendance in public schools. 
  
My solution is to identify two groups of potential ELL students in the 2000 Census 
and the 2005, 2006, and 2007 American Community Survey public use microdata 
samples.  The first group consists of recent-arrival first-generation immigrant children, 
attending K–12 public schools, and not living in group quarters.  I define recent-arrival 
as less than three years since migration so that the average treatment effects are based 
on students always subject to the initiative or never subject to the initiative.  To 
abstract from the potential effect of the initiatives on school dropout status, I restrict 
the sample to respondents between 8 and 16 years old so that every child is subject to 
state compulsory schooling laws. 
                                                 
 
6 For example, an alternative objective measure of English language proficiency that 
could be used with my identification strategy is reading test scores from the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).  However, the NAEP only started 
collecting data on former ELL students in 2005, and it exempts between 20 to 25 
percent of students from the assessments between 1998 and 2005. 
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The advantage of these samples over those of previous studies is that I do not 
gain or lose students as they develop their English language proficiency.  The least 
English proficient students are still in the sample due to the outreach of the Census and 
the American Community Survey to count households who do not speak English.  
And, since first-generation and second-generation immigrant statuses are fixed 
attributes, I do not exclude any students once they become fluent English proficient. 
An additional feature of these samples is that the average treatment effect 
estimator is based on students consistently treated with the SEI initiatives and students 
consistently treated with previous programs.  One limitation of previous evaluations is 
that the effect of the initiative may in fact be due to the disruption in the language of 
instruction rather than the change in the language instruction to English.  Because the 
two samples exclude students with partial exposure to each policy regime, the average 
treatment effect estimator cannot be interpreted as the effect of an instructional 
disruption. 
B. Econometric Framework 
The primary econometric specification is Equation (1) for student i , born in 
source country c , with home language l , and living in neighborhood n  in 
experimental group s  in period t .  I use sample weights for the five percent 2000 
sample as is, and I pool and reweight the one percent 2005, 2006, and 2007 American 
Community Survey samples (hereafter referred to as the 2005 sample) into a single 
year.  I use sample weights for the five percent 2000 sample as is, and I pool and 
reweight the one percent 2005, 2006, and 2007 American Community Survey samples 
(hereafter referred to as the 2005 sample) into a single year.7
                                                 
 
7 Specially, I reweight each observation so that total weight in each of 2005, 2006, and 
  The dependent variable 
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is parent-reported English speaking ability,  , which takes on values of speaks English 
(3) “at home” or “very well,” (2) “well,” (1) “not well,” and (0) “not at all.”  
Unfortunately, the data do not include historical values of parent-reported English 
speaking ability, so I cannot use a value-added methodology that controls for initial 
English language proficiency.  The average treatment effect estimator that gives the 
relative effectiveness of the SEI initiatives is 3β .  If 0ˆ3 >β , then the SEI initiatives 
are associated with greater English language proficiency than previous programs; if 
0ˆ3 <β , then previous programs such as Transitional Bilingual Education and English 
as a Second Language are more effective than the SEI initiatives. 
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I include student and household control variables in X  to compare students 
with similar observable characteristics.  The student control variables for both samples 
include sex and race.  For recent-arrival first-generation immigrants, I also control for 
years since migration dummy variables and age at arrival (quadratic); for young 
second-generation immigrants, I also control for age dummy variables.  The household 
controls are the natural log of household income in 2000 dollars, the head’s highest 
grade completed, and household size.8
                                                                                                                                            
 
2007 contributes one-third of the average total weight across all three years. 
  For young second-generation immigrants, I 
also control for the head’s years since migration (quadratic).  In some specifications, I 
control for the head’s English speaking ability, although this variable is endogenous if 
children teach English to their less fluent parents.  Lastly, I control for family 
8 The family interrelationship variables are from the Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series (Steven Ruggles, et al. 2008).  I standardize income across surveys so that the 
top-codes are the same in 2000, 2005, 2006, and 2007 for each type of income. 
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composition with dummy variables for single mother, single father, and no parent, 
with two-parent families as the omitted category. 
The ideal empirical specification would control for district, school, and teacher 
characteristics, but the smallest identifiable area in the public use Census and the 
American Community Survey is the public use microdata area, which typically 
contains 100,000 people.  Thus, the best available proxy for school quality is the 
natural log of neighborhood median household income in 2000 dollars, where the 
neighborhood is defined as the public use microdata area.  I also control for the 
neighborhood home language concentration, which measures the cost of maintaining 
home languages (Edward P. Lazear 1999).  I impute the home language for 
immigrants that speak English “at home” because many continue to be fluent in the 
language spoken at arrival.  The imputation is based on the modal language among 
immigrants from the same country with one year since migration in the 2000 Census.  
I set this variable equal to zero and a dummy variable to one for English home 
language status, which makes the effect of neighborhood home language concentration 
due to non-English home languages only. 
For recent-arrival first-generation immigrants, I also include source country 
fixed-effects for countries with at least five observations in the treatment and control 
groups in both 2000 and 2005 and assign the remaining immigrants to five world 
region dummy variables.  I use similarly constructed source country fixed-effects for 
the household head in the young second-generation immigrant sample.  This allows 
me to partially control for fixed, unobservable characteristics by source country that 
are correlated with English speaking ability.  I also experiment with alternative 
specifications that replace country fixed-effects with similarly constructed language 
fixed-effects.  In these specifications, I control for Chiswick and Miller’s (2005) 
measure of linguistic distance from the English language.  The home language 
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variables are based on the imputation strategy described above, and I set the linguistic 
distance variable equal to zero if the home language is English.  Lastly, I cluster 
standard errors to allow for an arbitrary correlation of error terms at the state-year 
level. 
Table 2. Sample Statistics for Recent-Arrival First-Generation Immigrants in 2000 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Arizona and Other 
West 
 Massachusetts and 
Other Northeast 
 Treatment Control  Treatment Control 
Parent-reported ESA  1.774 2.035  2.189 2.188 
 (1.037) (0.954)  (0.915) (0.918) 
Zero YSM  0.089 0.106  0.079 0.091 
 (0.284) (0.308)  (0.270) (0.287) 
One YSM 0.509 0.488  0.534 0.494 
 (0.500) (0.500)  (0.499) (0.500) 
Two YSM  0.402 0.406  0.387 0.415 
 (0.491) (0.491)  (0.488) (0.493) 
Ln income 9.707 10.062  9.828 9.838 
 (2.313) (1.853)  (2.419) (2.384) 
Head education 9.310 11.074  11.939 11.819 
 (4.824) (4.883)  (4.109) (4.279) 
Head self-rep. ESA  1.411 1.735  1.853 1.930 
 (1.120) (1.082)  (1.050) (1.059) 
N 595 1882  623 3807 
Weighted N 14023 51316  15561 102533 
Sources: 2000 Census. 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  The sample consists of 
first-generation immigrants, attending public school, not living in group 
quarters, eight to sixteen years old, and with zero to two years since 
migration.  The West excludes California.  The West excludes California. 
Table 2 presents selected sample means and standard deviations for recent-
arrival first-generation immigrants before the initiatives in 2000.  There are some 
statistically significant differences in observables between the treatment and control 
group in Arizona and Other West.  For example, both children and their household 
heads have lower English speaking ability in Arizona than in Other West.  In both 
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regions, however, parents rate their children as having higher English speaking ability 
than they do for themselves.  In addition, Arizona recent-arrival first-generation 
immigrants have household heads with almost two years less education and have 
lower household income than their counterparts in Other West.  In contrast, there are 
few differences in observables between the treatment and control group in 
Massachusetts and Other Northeast. 
Table 3. Sample Statistics for Young Second-Generation Immigrants in 2000 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Arizona and Other 
West 
 Massachusetts and 
Other Northeast 
 Treatment Control  Treatment Control 
Parent-reported ESA  2.598 2.710  2.799 2.801 
 (0.650) (0.561)  (0.457) (0.487) 
Eight years old 0.294 0.289  0.237 0.264 
 (0.456) (0.453)  (0.426) (0.441) 
Nine years old 0.276 0.273  0.326 0.260 
 (0.447) (0.446)  (0.469) (0.438) 
Ten years old 0.254 0.225  0.226 0.250 
 (0.436) (0.418)  (0.418) (0.433) 
Ln income 10.250 10.500  10.717 10.564 
 (1.418) (1.249)  (1.097) (1.524) 
Head education 9.435 9.935  11.679 12.071 
 (4.620) (4.899)  (4.383) (4.106) 
Head self-rep. ESA  1.841 2.021  2.213 2.288 
 (0.999) (0.889)  (0.881) (0.837) 
N 1385 3801  1080 8449 
Weighted N 35615 99651  25085 227520 
Sources: 2000 Census. 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  The sample consists of 
second-generation immigrants, attending public school, not living in group 
quarters, and eight to ten years old.  The West excludes California. 
Table 3 shows that there are fewer differences in observables between the 
treatment and control groups in the young second-generation immigrant sample.  For 
example, the differences in parent-reported English speaking ability and the head’s 
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self-reported English speaking ability by experimental group in Arizona and Other 
West are of smaller magnitude, and household income is similar across experimental 
groups in both regions.  Notably, parents continue to rate their children as having 
higher English speaking ability than they do for themselves.  Lastly, the household 
income and the head’s self-reported English speaking ability of young second-
generation immigrants are greater than those of recent-arrival first-generation 
immigrants, which is due to their greater economic assimilation with more years since 
migration to the United States. 
IV. The Effects of the Arizona and Massachusetts SEI Initiatives 
Table 4 presents the basic average treatment effect estimates without any 
control variables for recent-arrival first-generation immigrants and young second-
generation immigrants.  The upper left panel shows that the mean English speaking 
ability in Arizona is lower than that of nearby states in both 2000 and 2005.  The 
average treatment effect of the Arizona SEI initiative on parent-reported English 
speaking ability is -0.081 but is not statistically significant.  In contrast, the upper right 
panel for the Massachusetts and Other Northeast shows that while the mean English 
speaking ability is the same in the treatment and control group in 2000, it is lower in 
the treatment group in 2005.  The average treatment effect of the Massachusetts SEI 
initiative is -0.191 units, which corresponds to a decrease of 0.21 standard deviations 
of parent-reported English speaking ability.  The results provide mixed evidence that 
there is a negative effect of the SEI initiatives on English language proficiency, with 
no difference in the effectiveness of Arizona Proposition 203 and a lower 
effectiveness of Massachusetts Question 2.  To the extent that most ELL students in 
Massachusetts received Transitional Bilingual Education prior to the SEI initiative, 
this means that recent-arrival first-generation immigrant students have higher English 
language proficiency with Transitional Bilingual Education than they do with SEI. 
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Table 4. Baseline Average Treatment Effects on Parent-Reported ESA 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Arizona and Other West  Massachusetts and Other Northeast 
 2000 2005 Difference  2000 2005 Difference 
Recent-Arrival First-Generation Immigrants 
Treatment 1.774** 1.784** 0.010  2.189** 1.953** -0.236** 
 (0.046) (0.072) (0.086)  (0.040) (0.063) (0.075) 
 [595] [239] [834]  [623] [233] [856] 
Control 2.035** 2.125** 0.091**  2.188** 2.143** -0.045 
 (0.025) (0.038) (0.045)  (0.017) (0.030) (0.035) 
 [1882] [777] [2659]  [3807] [1266] [5073] 
Difference -0.261** -0.341** -0.081  0.001 -0.190** -0.191** 
 (0.053) (0.081) (0.097)  (0.044) (0.070) (0.082) 
 [2477] [1016] [3493]  [4430] [1499] [5929] 
        
Young Second-Generation Immigrants 
Treatment 2.576** 2.782** 0.205**  2.793** 2.870** 0.077** 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.030)  (0.017) (0.024) (0.029) 
 [1133] [776] [1909]  [855] [421] [1276] 
Control 2.692** 2.780** 0.088**  2.795** 2.846** 0.051** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.018)  (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) 
 [3004] [2017] [5021]  [6521] [3782] [10303] 
Difference -0.116** 0.002 0.117**  -0.002 0.024 0.026 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.034)  (0.018) (0.026) (0.032) 
 [4137] [2793] [6930]  [7376] [4203] [11579] 
Sources: 2000 Census and 2005, 2006, 2007 American Community Survey. 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Sample sizes are in 
brackets.  The sample in the top panel consists of first-generation immigrants, 
attending public school, not living in group quarters, eight to sixteen years old, and 
with zero to two years since migration unless otherwise specified.  The sample in the 
bottom panel consists of second-generation immigrants, attending public school, not 
living in group quarters, and eight to ten years old unless otherwise specified.  The 
West excludes California. 
The results for young second-generation immigrant students show very 
different effects of the SEI initiatives.  To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the 
first to decompose the average treatment effect of a language instructional educational 
program by nativity.  In the bottom left panel, the results indicate that while the 
parent-reported English speaking ability of second-generation immigrants was lower 
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in 2000, by 2005 they were the same.  The average treatment effect is 0.117 units, 
which is equal to 0.18 standard deviations of parent-reported English speaking ability.  
In contrast, the results for Massachusetts show no such effect, with the average parent-
reported English speaking being the same between treatment and control groups in 
both 2000 and 2005.  To the extent that young children are more likely to receive 
Transitional Bilingual Education, the results imply that young second-generation 
immigrants have higher English language proficiency with the SEI initiatives than 
with Transitional Bilingual Education, at least in Arizona. 
To ensure that I compare the parent-reported English speaking ability of 
children with similar observables, Table 5 presents estimates for recent-arrival first-
generation immigrants that control for child, household, and neighborhood 
characteristics.  Column (1) for the Arizona and Other West and (4) for the 
Massachusetts and Other Northeast are the preferred specification which controls for 
sex, race, years since migration dummy variables, age at arrival (quadratic), household 
income, head’s highest grade completed, household size, family composition, 
neighborhood median household income, neighborhood home language concentration, 
and source country fixed-effects.  The average treatment effect estimate of the Arizona 
SEI initiative is -0.125, which is close to marginal statistical significance.  In contrast, 
the coefficient estimate for Massachusetts shows that the initiative decreases parent-
reported English speaking ability by 0.138 units.  When I convert the coefficient 
estimates into effect sizes, Arizona Proposition 203 and Massachusetts Question 2 
decrease parent-reported English speaking ability by 0.12 and 0.15 standard 
deviations, respectively. 
The coefficient estimates for the control variables are consistent with those of 
the literature.  The first year of residence in the United States is associated with an 
increase of 0.292 to 0.188 units of parent-reported English speaking ability, and I use 
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these coefficient estimates to transform to the average treatment effect into a 
developmental delay of 0.43 to 0.73 years for the Arizona and Massachusetts SEI 
initiatives, respectively.  The effects of household characteristics operate in expected 
directions: the head’s highest grade completed and household income are both 
associated with greater parent-reported English speaking ability. 
Table 5. The Effect of the Initiatives on the ESA of First-Generation Immigrants 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Arizona and Other West  and Other Northeast 
Treatment -0.037 -0.062 -0.049  -0.013 0.005 -0.009 
 (0.053) (0.040) (0.052)  (0.036) (0.028) (0.035) 
Post 0.034 0.103* 0.040  -0.020 0.003 -0.035 
 (0.076) (0.056) (0.077)  (0.041) (0.036) (0.039) 
Treatment* -0.125 -0.150** -0.133  -0.138** -0.078* -0.148** 
 (0.084) (0.060) (0.083)  (0.046) (0.041) (0.042) 
Child Characteristics 
 One YSM  0.292** 0.261** 0.292**  0.188** 0.225** 0.198** 
  (0.089) (0.071) (0.091)  (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) 
 Two YSM  0.576** 0.566** 0.569**  0.461** 0.499** 0.469** 
  (0.079) (0.063) (0.080)  (0.099) (0.100) (0.096) 
Household Characteristics 
 Ln income 0.030** 0.008 0.030**  0.019** 0.006 0.020** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
 Head  0.027** 0.003 0.030**  0.028** 0.005* 0.028** 
 education (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 Head self-   0.354**    0.321**  
 rep. ESA  (0.035)    (0.015)  
Child FE: Country Country Language  Country Country Language 
R^2 0.240 0.354 0.233  0.244 0.336 0.246 
Sources: 2000 Census and 2005, 2006, 2007 American Community Survey. 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05.  Clustered standard errors by state-year are in parentheses.  
The sample consists of first-generation immigrants, attending public school, not living 
in group quarters, eight to sixteen years old, and with zero to two years since 
migration.  The West excludes California.  All models also control for a constant, sex, 
race, age at arrival (quadratic), household size, family composition, ln median 
neighborhood household income, and neighborhood home language concentration.  
Columns (3) and (6) also control for English initial language dummy, linguistic 
distance, and missing linguistic distance dummy. 
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Table 6. The Effect of the Initiatives on the ESA of Second-Generation Immigrants 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Arizona and Other West  Massachusetts and Other Northeast 
Treatment -0.074** -0.071** -0.076**  0.007 0.010 0.008 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Post 0.066** 0.073** 0.063**  0.033** 0.039** 0.037** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)  (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) 
Treatment* 0.116** 0.128** 0.116**  0.027** 0.024** 0.025** 
Post (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Child Characteristics 
 Nine years  0.049** 0.051** 0.050**  0.030** 0.030** 0.030** 
 old (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 Ten years  0.092** 0.089** 0.093**  0.039** 0.039** 0.039** 
 old (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Household Characteristics 
 Ln income 0.041** 0.032** 0.042**  0.009* 0.006 0.009* 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 Head  0.012** 0.004 0.013**  0.009** 0.005 0.009** 
 education (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
 Head self-    0.123**    0.063**  
 rep. ESA  (0.011)    (0.014)  
Head FE: Country Country Language  Country Country Language 
R^2 0.084 0.114 0.082  0.064 0.073 0.063 
Sources: 2000 Census and 2005, 2006, 2007 American Community Survey. 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05.  Clustered standard errors by state-year are in parentheses.  
The sample consists of second-generation immigrants, attending public school, not 
living in group quarters, and eight to ten years old.  The West excludes California.  All 
models also control for a constant, sex, race, household size, head years since 
migration (quadratic), ln median neighborhood household income, and neighborhood 
home language concentration.  Columns (3) and (6) also control for English initial 
language dummy, linguistic distance, and missing linguistic distance dummy. 
Columns (2) and (5) also control for the head’s self-reported English speaking 
ability so that English speaking ability is judged by similar parents.  The results 
indicate that the SEI initiative in Arizona is associated with a 0.150 unit decrease in 
parent-reported English speaking ability, which is statistically significant.  The 
inclusion of this control variable results in a smaller average treatment effect in 
absolute value in Massachusetts, although it is still marginally statistically significant.  
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Household income and head’s highest grade completed are not statistically significant 
in these specifications because they are highly correlated with the head’s self-reported 
English speaking ability. 
As discussed above, the sample sizes preclude the use of both source country 
and language fixed-effects.  Columns (3) and (6) include language fixed-effects in 
place of source country fixed-effects.  These specifications compare students of 
similar language backgrounds rather than countries of origin.  For example, it groups 
together all immigrants with Spanish home languages rather than just those born in 
Mexico or whose household head is born in Mexico.  The shift to language fixed-
effects does not have an appreciable effect on the average treatment effects of SEI in 
either region. 
Table 6 presents the results for young second-generation immigrant students 
that control for student, household, and neighborhood characteristics.  Columns (1) 
and (4) present the preferred specification that controls for sex, race, age, household 
size, head years since migration (quadratic), household income, head grade completed, 
median household income, neighborhood home language concentration, and head 
source country fixed-effects.  The results show that the Arizona SEI initiative is 
associated with a 0.116 unit increase in parent-reported English speaking ability, 
which is equivalent to 0.18 standard deviations.  The results also show that the 
Massachusetts SEI initiative is associated with a 0.027 unit increase in parent-reported 
English speaking ability at a statistically significant level, which is equivalent to 0.06 
standard deviations.  Using the coefficient estimate for the gain in parent-reported 
English speaking ability between eight and nine years old, the Arizona and 
Massachusetts SEI initiatives are associated with developmental gains of 2.37 and 
0.90 years, respectively.  Since most elementary school children receive instruction 
that includes home language, the results indicate that for young second-generation 
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immigrants, the SEI initiatives are actually associated with greater parent-reported 
English speaking ability than Transitional Bilingual Education. 
Table 7. Heterogeneous Average Treatment Effects by Home Language and Age 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 First-Generation Immigrants  Second-Generation Immigrants 
 Arizona Massachusetts  Arizona Massachusetts 
Home language      
 Spanish -0.073 -0.236**  0.121** 0.142** 
 (0.096) (0.100)  (0.040) (0.019) 
 Other languages -0.201** -0.111**  0.076** -0.032** 
 (0.097) (0.022)  (0.018) (0.012) 
      
Age      
 Eight to ten years  -0.126 -0.143*    
 old (0.096) (0.071)    
 Eleven to thirteen  0.106 -0.152**    
 years old (0.095) (0.059)    
 Fourteen to  -0.413** -0.081**    
 sixteen years old (0.086) (0.038)    
Sources: 2000 Census and 2005, 2006, 2007 American Community Survey. 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05.  Clustered standard errors by state-year are in parentheses.  
The sample in columns (1) and (2) consists of first-generation immigrants, attending 
public school, not living in group quarters, eight to sixteen years old, and with zero to 
two years since migration unless otherwise specified.  The sample in columns (3) and 
(4) consists of second-generation immigrants, attending public school, not living in 
group quarters, and eight to ten years old unless otherwise specified.  The West 
excludes California.  All models control for a constant, treatment, post, sex, race, 
household size, ln median neighborhood household income, and neighborhood home 
language concentration.  Columns (1) and (2) also control for years since migration 
dummy variables, age at arrival (quadratic), and child country fixed effects, and 
columns (3) and (4) also control for age dummy variables, head years since migration 
(quadratic), and head country fixed effects. 
As for the other control variables, an additional year in school is positively 
associated with parent-reported English speaking ability, although the return to each 
year is lower than the return among recent-arrival first-generation immigrants.  This is 
due to the higher initial parent-reported English speaking ability of young second-
generation immigrants that comes from being born in the United States with eight to 
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ten years of experience in the country.  Lastly, the household control variables operate 
in expected directions, with household income and head’s education being positively 
associated with parent-reported English speaking ability. 
I attempt to push the data further by testing for heterogeneous average 
treatment effects in Table 7.  The idea here is to exploit the different distributions of 
programs by state and cohort to estimate the effectiveness of the SEI initiatives 
relative to specific programs.  The first approach relies on the common argument that 
only Spanish speakers have a sufficient number of students to qualify for Transitional 
Bilingual Education (Christine H. Rossell 2003).  The top panel presents average 
treatment effects from models estimated separately for students with Spanish home 
languages, which proxies for Transitional Bilingual Education, and for students with 
all other home languages, which proxies for English as a Second Language.  The 
results indicate that for recent-arrival first-generation immigrants, Arizona Spanish 
speaking students are associated with a decrease in parent-reported English speaking 
ability but not at a statistically significant level.  In contrast, non-Spanish speaking 
students in Arizona and all recent-arrival first-generation immigrants in Massachusetts 
have lower parent-reported English speaking ability with the SEI initiatives.  The 
results for young second-generation immigrants show that Spanish speakers are the 
students associated with the greatest gains.  One potential interpretation is that the 
developmental interdependence hypothesis is correct: young second-generation 
immigrants have sufficient English language proficiency to learn from instruction in 
English, but recent-arrival second-generation immigrants do not. 
The bottom panel presents average treatment effects from separate regressions 
by age for recent-arrival first-generation immigrants.  The idea here is that young 
children are more likely to receive Transitional Bilingual Education.  The 
specifications also test whether the difference in average treatment effects between 
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recent-arrival first-generation immigrants and young second-generation immigrants 
are due to different age groups (eight to sixteen versus eight to ten, respectively).  
Unfortunately, the different average treatment effects for Arizona by age group do not 
lend themselves to any compelling interpretation.  In contrast, the results for 
Massachusetts show that the oldest group experiences the smallest decrease in parent-
reported English speaking ability in absolute value.  However, both results for the 
eight to ten year old subset show that the difference in average treatment effects by 
nativity is not due to the difference in age groups for the two samples. 
Table 8. Multinomial Logit Average Marginal Effects of the SEI Initiatives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Arizona and Other West 
Recent-Arrival First-Generation Immigrants 
Treatment 0.028** -0.021 -0.025** 0.018 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.012) (0.022) 
Post -0.023* -0.004 0.049** -0.022 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.025) (0.034) 
Treatment*Post 0.028 -0.021 0.107*** -0.115*** 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) 
     
Young Second-Generation Immigrants 
Treatment 0.001 0.019** 0.008 -0.028*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) 
Post -0.003 -0.009 -0.039** 0.051*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.019) (0.020) 
Treatment*Post -0.003 -0.024*** -0.027 0.054** 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.020) (0.023) 
Sources: 2000 Census and 2005, 2006, 2007 American Community Survey. 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  Clustered standard errors by state-year are in 
parentheses.  The sample consists of first-generation immigrants, attending public 
school, not living in group quarters, eight to sixteen years old, and with zero to two 
years since migration.  The West excludes California.  All models also control for a 
constant, sex, race, age at arrival (quadratic), household size, family composition, ln 
median neighborhood household income, neighborhood home language concentration, 
and child country fixed effects.  Very well includes speaks English at home. 
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Table 8 (Continued). 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Massachusetts and Other Northeast 
Recent-Arrival First-Generation Immigrants 
Treatment  0.019*** -0.005 -0.016 0.002 
  (0.006) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) 
Post  -0.008 0.018 0.002 -0.013 
  (0.007) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) 
Treatment*Post  -0.014** 0.046** 0.078*** -0.110*** 
  (0.006) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) 
     
Young Second-Generation Immigrants 
Treatment  -0.001* -0.015*** 0.031*** -0.015** 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) 
Post  0.003** -0.008* -0.026*** 0.031*** 
  (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Treatment*Post  -0.003*** 0.008 -0.024*** 0.019*** 
  (0.000) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Overall, the specifications show that the SEI initiatives are associated with 
developmental delays for recent-arrival first-generation immigrants and with 
developmental gains for young second-generation immigrants.  The results provide 
suggestive evidence that the primary difference in effectiveness is between SEI and 
Transitional Bilingual Education, although additional cuts of the data based on home 
language and age group are largely unable to confirm this explanation. 
V. Robustness Checks: Cardinality, Placebos, and Other Control Groups 
I estimate three sets of robustness exercises in this section.  The first relaxes 
the cardinality of parent-reported English speaking ability a multinomial logit 
specification, in which the dependent variable takes on each value of parent-reported 
English speaking ability.  These models allow the SEI initiatives and control variables 
to have different marginal effects at each point of the parent-reported English speaking 
ability distribution.  The average marginal effects results in Table 8 show that most of 
the effect of the initiatives take place between the speaks English “well” group and the 
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speaks English “very well” or “at home” group in both samples.  In addition, in 
specifications not shown but available upon request, I group the speaks English “at 
home” with the speaks English “well” group and get similar average treatment effect 
estimates in the primary ordinary least squares specifications for both regions. 
The second set of robustness checks test whether the initiatives affect students 
that should not be affected.  The top panel of Table 9 presents the results of assigning 
a placebo to Colorado with Other West (excluding Arizona and California) as the 
control group.  Colorado is the only other state to also consider the SEI initiative, but 
since it did not pass it in 2002, there should be no effect on parent-reported English 
speaking ability.  Surprisingly, the average treatment effect in this falsification test 
shows that the parent-reported English speaking ability of recent-arrival first-
generation immigrants actually increased by 0.244 units.  The next set of falsification 
tests assign placebos to first-generation immigrant students with at greater years since 
migration in the same state since they may be fluent English proficient and learn in 
mainstream classrooms; the control groups are comparable students in the Other West 
and Other Northeast.  The results show that the Arizona SEI initiative continues to 
have a negative effect on the parent-reported English speaking ability up through the 
eighth year in the United States.  In contrast, the Massachusetts SEI initiative increases 
parent-reported English speaking ability for immigrants with three to five years since 
migration and has no effect for those with more than six years since migration.  
Overall, the falsification tests support the idea that recent-arrival first-generation 
immigrants who should not be affected by the SEI initiatives are indeed unaffected, 
although the Colorado test suggests that other unobserved state-time trends may be 
present in the data. 
The final set of robustness checks address the presence of unobserved state-
time interactions that may explain the results rather than any actual effect of the SEI 
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initiatives.  To minimize the bias from differential trends in unobservables, I present 
average treatment effect estimates using alternative control groups that mirror the 
political conditions and program histories of the treatment groups in Table 10. 
The first source of bias is that the consideration of the SEI initiatives is 
correlated with the selection of immigrants into the treatment group.  Migration 
responses to local political conditions bias the average treatment effect estimator 
toward a beneficial effect of the SEI initiatives if less English speaking ability 
immigrants choose to live in surrounding control states.  As discussed above, one 
alternative control group that has a similar immigrant policy climate is Colorado 
because it also considered the SEI initiative.  Row (1) presents the estimates for 
recent-arrival first-generation immigrants that use Colorado as the control group and 
shows a -0.263 unit decrease in parent-reported English speaking ability due to the 
Arizona Proposition 203 and a -0.309 unit decrease due to the Massachusetts Question 
2.  For young second-generation immigrants, columns (3) and (4) show that the SEI 
initiative continues to be relatively more effect in Arizona but actually less effective in 
Massachusetts. 
Older cohorts of potential ELL students in the same stated are a second control 
group with similar trends in unobservables.  First-generation immigrants with more 
than six years since migration in Arizona and Massachusetts may be a suitable control 
group for recent-arrival first-generation immigrants because they are less likely to 
participate in language instruction educational programs, and the same goes for 
second-generation immigrants who are older than ten years old.  Same-state control 
groups address the concern that parent assessments of English speaking ability are 
responding to the outcome of the election rather than a change in the child’s English 
language proficiency.  However, a concern is that the SEI initiatives may also affect 
the student achievement of non-ELL students due to changes in peer groups and 
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district financial resources (Nora Gordon and Caroline Hoxby 2002).  With this caveat 
in mind, in Row (2), I use the same-state first-generation immigrants with six to eight 
years since migration as the control group and find a similar negative effect of the 
Arizona SEI initiative, although it is not statistically significant.  In contrast, I find that 
the average treatment effect of the Massachusetts SEI initiative is -0.254 units.  In 
Row (3), I repeat this process for second-generation immigrants using eleven to 
thirteen years old children as the control group, and again there is a benefit of the SEI 
initiative in Arizona but not in Massachusetts. 
The third alternative control group uses state English only laws to identify 
states with a similar immigrant policy climate.  States with English only laws may be 
similar to Arizona and Massachusetts because they encourage the use of English over 
home languages.  Row (4) uses the set of English only states excluding California, 
Arizona, and Massachusetts as the control group.  The average treatment effect 
estimates are negative and statistically significant for both Arizona and Massachusetts 
for recent-arrival first-generation immigrants.  And again, the SEI initiatives are 
associated with a developmental gain for young second-generation immigrants in 
Arizona but not in Massachusetts. 
The second set of alternative control groups consists of states with similar 
program distributions before the SEI initiatives.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
districts that use Transitional Bilingual Education are shifting instruction away from 
home languages and toward English to meet the assessment requirements of NCLB 
(Mary A. Zehr 2007).  To check whether the negative effect of the SEI initiatives 
among recent-arrival first-generation immigrants is instead attributable to responses to 
NCLB, I use the five states that currently require Transitional Bilingual Education — 
Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Texas — as an alternative control 
group for Massachusetts.  The average treatment effect estimate for Massachusetts is -
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0.111 units for recent-arrival first-generation immigrants.  For young second-
generation immigrants, the results show no effect of the Massachusetts SEI initiative. 
Table 9. State and Cohort Falsification Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Colorado and 
Other West 
Arizona and 
Other West 
Massachusetts 
and Other 
Northeast 
Recent-Arrival First-Generation Immigrants 
 Zero to two years since migration 0.244**   
  (0.077)   
 Three to five years since migration  -0.113** 0.048** 
   (0.054) (0.016) 
 Six to eight years since migration  -0.070** 0.017 
   (0.023) (0.019) 
 Nine or more years since migration  0.005 0.006 
   (0.015) (0.013) 
    
Young Second-Generation Immigrants 
 Eight to ten years old -0.130**   
 (0.014)   
 Eleven to thirteen years old  0.037** -0.008 
   (0.016) (0.009) 
 Fourteen to sixteen years old  -0.030* 0.011 
   (0.015) (0.011) 
Sources: 2000 Census and 2005, 2006, 2007 American Community Survey. 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05.  Clustered standard errors by state-year are in parentheses.  
The sample in the top panel consists of first-generation immigrants, attending public 
school, not living in group quarters, eight to sixteen years old, and with zero to two 
years since migration unless otherwise specified.  The sample in the bottom panel 
consists of second-generation immigrants, attending public school, not living in group 
quarters, and eight to ten years old unless otherwise specified.  The West excludes 
California.  All models control for a constant, treatment, post, sex, race, household 
size, ln median neighborhood household income, and neighborhood home language 
concentration.  The top panel also controls for years since migration dummy variables, 
age at arrival (quadratic), and child country fixed effects, and the bottom panel also 
controls for age dummy variables, head years since migration (quadratic), and head 
country fixed effects. 
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Table 10. Average Treatment Effects Using Alternative Control Groups 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Recent-Arrival First-Generation 
Immigrants 
 Young Second-Generation 
Immigrants 
 Arizona Massachusetts  Arizona Massachusetts 
Alternative Control Group 
 Colorado -0.263** -0.309**  0.094** -0.040** 
 (0.019) (0.030)  (0.015) (0.016) 
 Same state, six to  -0.110 -0.254**    
 eight YSM (0.087) (0.076)    
 Same state, 11-     0.119** 0.025 
 13 years old    (0.040) (0.041) 
 English only law  -0.165** -0.251**  0.096** -0.046* 
 states (0.029) (0.030)  (0.019) (0.024) 
 States without  -0.110**   0.071**  
 TBE laws (0.028)   (0.016)  
 States with   -0.111**   -0.022 
 TBE laws  (0.035)   (0.021) 
 States with similar  -0.126** -0.229**  0.134** 0.005 
 programs  (0.061) (0.059)  (0.025) (0.027) 
Sources: 2000 Census and 2005, 2006, 2007 American Community Survey. 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05.  Clustered standard errors by state-year are in parentheses.  
The sample consists of first-generation immigrants, attending public school, not living 
in group quarters, eight to sixteen years old, and with zero to two years since 
migration.  The West excludes California.  All models also control for a constant, sex, 
race, age at arrival (quadratic), household size, family composition, ln median 
neighborhood household income, and neighborhood home language concentration.  
Columns (1) and (2) also control for years since migration dummy variables (as 
applicable), age at arrival (quadratic), and child country fixed effects, and columns (3) 
and (4) also control for age dummy variables (as applicable), head years since 
migration (quadratic) and head country fixed effects.  Row (2) also controls for years 
since migration (quadratic), and row (3) also controls for age (quadratic). 
The last alternative control group uses states with similar program distributions 
from Kindler’s (2002) analysis of state survey data.  I select the nearest five states 
above and below Arizona and Massachusetts in the share of ELL students that 
received instruction that incorporates home languages as the alternative control 
groups.  The average treatment effect estimates are qualitatively similar to those of the 
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primary specification for both samples: recent-arrival first-generation immigrants have 
higher parent-reported English speaking ability using previous programs in both 
Arizona and Massachusetts, and young second-generation immigrants in Arizona have 
higher parent-reported English speaking ability with the SEI initiatives. 
Thus, the robustness checks confirm that the Arizona and Massachusetts SEI 
initiatives decrease the parent-reported English speaking ability of recent-arrival first-
generation immigrants and increase the parent-reported English speaking ability of 
young second-generation immigrants in Arizona.  The results raise some doubt that the 
Massachusetts initiative actually had a positive effect among young second-generation 
immigrants and suggests instead that it is equally effective as previous programs. 
VI. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Over 6.41 million people in California, Arizona, Massachusetts, and Colorado 
voted in support of initiatives that require K–12 public school districts to provide ELL 
students with SEI for a period not normally to exceed one year.  The initiatives were 
passed in California, Arizona, and Massachusetts and were intended to accelerate the 
development of English language proficiency relative to previous programs, such as 
Transitional Bilingual Education and English as a Second Language.  As of 2005, 
nearly one million ELL students are subject to the SEI initiatives.  What does the data 
say about the relative effectiveness of Arizona Proposition 203 and Massachusetts 
Question 2? 
This paper presents evidence that Arizona Proposition 203 and Massachusetts 
Question 2 are less effective than previous programs in developing the English 
language proficiency of recent-arrival first-generation immigrants.  The average 
treatment effect estimates correspond to developmental delays of an additional 0.43 to 
0.73 years of school.  These results are consistent with Gordon and Hoxby’s (2002) 
evidence that California Proposition 227 decrease the reading and language test scores 
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of ELL students.  However, I also show that the relative effectiveness of the SEI 
initiatives on young second-generation immigrants is positive.  To the best of my 
knowledge, this paper is the first to show heterogeneous average treatment effects by 
nativity, where the SEI initiative is associated with a developmental gain of 0.90 to 
2.37 years of school.  These results imply that a one size fits all instructional policy 
does not serve ELL students well.  There are important differences between ELL 
students that lead to different optimal programs for different groups of ELL students. 
The different in average treatment effects beg the question of why recent-
arrival first-generation immigrants react differently to the SEI initiatives than young 
second-generation immigrants.  There are at least two potential explanations that 
suggest future avenues of research.  The first is that the higher initial English language 
proficiency of young second-generation immigrants makes them more receptive to 
instruction in English, even though they are classified as ELL.  Indeed, there is 
experimental evidence that second-generation immigrants perform better on tests in 
English than in home languages (Richard Akresh and Ilana Redstone Akresh 2008), 
which would explain the advantage of the SEI initiatives over Transitional Bilingual 
Education.  A second explanation is that young second-generation immigrants attend 
higher quality schools than recent-arrival first-generation immigrants.  Parents of 
young second-generation immigrants have greater human capital as measured by 
highest grade completed and self-reported English speaking proficiency than recent-
arrival first-generation immigrants, which may lead them to live in wealthier 
neighborhoods with better schools. 
My results have important implications for ELL students and stakeholders in 
K–12 public education.  For ELL students, the importance of the relative effectiveness 
of the SEI initiatives is obvious given that English language proficiency is positively 
associated with schooling, occupational choice, and wages.  The results are also 
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important to all stakeholders in K–12 public education due to the accountability of 
provisions of NCLB.  The designation of ELL students as a special subgroup in Title I 
increases their relative importance as schools aim for adequate yearly progress, and 
Title III imposes annual measurable achievement objectives for their English language 
proficiency.  The accountability measures for the long-run failure to meet these 
objectives include reduced federal funds and the dismissal of administrators and 
teachers, which would affect the instruction for all students regardless of language 
background.  Moreover, the failure to develop English language proficiency, even in 
the short-run, may affect the community at large by depressing local housing prices if 
it decreases public measures of school quality (Sandra E. Black 1999; David N. Figlio 
and Maurice E. Lucas 2004). 
Finally, the results also relate to whether the initiative process is a good way to 
set public policy.  On the on hand, initiatives allow voters to overcome principal-agent 
problems between the electorate and policymakers.  District administrators, teachers, 
and state legislators are often not accountable for using relatively ineffective programs 
that serve their own interests, and the initiative process allows the electorate to compel 
agents to switch to more effective programs.  On the other hand, it is unlikely that the 
average voter has an expert opinion on how to rapidly develop proficiency in a second 
language, even if the language in question happens to be the voter’s native tongue.  
When expert information is unavailable to the electorate, legislative bodies and non-
accountable policymakers (i.e. tenured teachers) often adopt better policies than 
citizens in a direct democracy (Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole 2004).  This paper 
demonstrates that after half a million dollars in Arizona and one million dollars in 
Massachusetts were spent on campaigns to inform voters, the electorate adopted 
initiatives that are less effective for the majority of ELL students than the programs 
chosen by districts, teachers, and state legislators.  However, it did benefit young 
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second-generation immigrants who make up a substantial portion of the ELL student 
population.  At least in the case studies of Arizona Proposition 203 and Massachusetts 
Question 2, the disadvantages of setting policy with initiatives appear to outweigh the 
advantages. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MEASUREMENT ERROR, MISSPECIFICATION, AND THE RETURN TO 
FOREIGN EDUCATION 
I. Introduction 
Estimates using the U.S. Census and the American Community Survey show 
that between 1970 and 2005, the immigrant share of the labor force tripled, from 5.8 
percent to 16.8 percent.9
Previous studies of the return to foreign education in the United States yield 
estimates between 4.2 and 5.9 percent (Julian R. Betts and Magnus Lofstrom 2000; 
Barry R. Chiswick 1978; Robert F. Schoeni 1997), which is less than the return to 
  Immigrant workers are an economically vulnerable 
population because their wages are lower than those of natives with similar 
observables.  A primary suspect for explaining the immigrant-native wage gap is the 
return to foreign education (Gilles Grenier 1984), which may be less than the return to 
domestic education among natives if human capital is not completely portable or if the 
quality of education differs between countries.  Thus, an accurate estimate of the 
return to foreign education may help us understand the wage structure of this 
increasingly important segment of the labor market.  It also has implications for 
policymakers who argue that admitting prospective immigrants with greater human 
capital decreases the net fiscal burden of immigration on taxpayers (Jonathan 
Weisman 2007). 
                                                 
 
9 The data are from the one percent Form 1 State sample of the 1970 U.S. Census and 
the one percent sample of the 2005 American Community Survey (Steven Ruggles, et 
al. 2008).  The sample consists of men and women between ages 16 and 64, with at 
least one year of potential work experience, and who worked last year. 
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domestic education among natives (for a review, see David Card 1999).  However, 
these studies are subject to two econometric problems.  The first is that foreign 
education is measured with error – data limitations in the U.S. Census have led 
scholars to calculate foreign education with a piecewise function of total education 
and age at arrival.  With a school starting age of six years and a maximum of 18 years 
of total education, the piecewise function implies that all immigrants whose age at 
arrival is at least 25 years old completed their total education abroad.  This assumption 
seems implausible given that older immigrants are more likely to attend school in the 
United States than natives of similar age (Julian R. Betts and Magnus Lofstrom 2000).  
If domestic education is more valuable than foreign education, this form measurement 
error will lead to upward bias in the return to foreign education. 
The second problem is that previous studies include domestic education as an 
endogenous control variable in their econometric specifications.  Given the interest in 
the overall causal effect of foreign education on wages, domestic education is 
endogenous because it is determined by foreign education – part of the return to 
foreign education operates through its effect on investment in domestic education.  
The direction of the misspecification bias depends on whether domestic education is 
positively or negatively correlated with foreign education.  On the one hand, highly-
educated immigrants may be more likely to have attended school in the United States 
if foreign education proxies for income or savings at the time of migration.  On the 
other hand, less-educated immigrants may be more likely to have attended school in 
the United States if foreign education proxies for the opportunity cost of school 
enrollment.  Unfortunately, the literature has yet to reach on consensus on the sign of 
this correlation, so the bias from controlling for domestic education, and thus the 
overall bias in previous studies, is ambiguous. 
In this paper, I make two contributions to the literature using longitudinally-
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linked data between the 1995, 1999, and 2004 October Supplements of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) and the nearest Outgoing Rotation Groups in the CPS basic 
monthly survey.  First, I study the measurement error in previous studies due to 
calculating foreign education with the piecewise function of total education and age at 
arrival.  The unique data in the October Supplements on schooling earned in the 
United States allows me to directly calculate foreign education as the difference 
between total education and domestic education.  Second, I analyze the bias from 
including domestic education as an endogenous control variable.  In particular, the 
supplemental data allows me to estimate the relationship between foreign education 
and domestic education. 
Using the standard specification in previous studies, the CPS data show a 5.8 
percent return to foreign education among immigrant men whose age at arrival is at 
least 25 years.  However, the data reveal substantial measurement error in foreign 
education, with 25 percent of immigrants having attended school in the United States, 
instead of zero percent as implied by the piecewise function of total education and age 
at arrival.  Correcting for measurement error leads to a lower return of 5.4 percent, 
which is consistent with the prior that domestic education is more valuable than 
foreign education.  Excluding domestic education as an endogenous control variable 
leads to an even lower return to foreign education of 3.3 percent.  The upward bias 
from over-controlling the specification is due to the negative correlation between 
foreign education and domestic education – an additional year of foreign education is 
associated with 0.32 less years of domestic education.  These two corrections result in 
an estimated return to foreign education that is considerably lower than those from 
previous studies, which is primarily due to omitting domestic education as an 
endogenous control variable.  The results are robust to (1) quantile regressions that 
reduce the bias from the top-coding of wages, (2) alternative samples based on age at 
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arrival and potential foreign work experience, (3) corrections for panel attrition, and 
(4) corrections for classical measurement error. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses 
previous studies, and section III describes the CPS data and research design used in 
this paper.  Section IV confirms the endogeneity of domestic education, section V 
decomposes the bias in previous estimates of the return to foreign education, and 
section VI presents the robustness exercises.  Lastly, section VII discusses the 
implications for labor economics and immigration policy. 
II. Econometric Approaches to Estimating the Return to Foreign Education 
A. The Thought Experiment 
The research objective is to measure the overall value of foreign education 
among immigrants in the United States.  The corresponding thought experiment is to 
randomly assign foreign education to immigrants at the time of migration and then 
estimate its effect on wages.  With this setup, endogenous post-migration investment 
in human capital should be excluded from the econometric specification because it is 
part of the return to foreign education.  This argument is same as the one against 
controlling for occupation when studying the gender pay gap (Francine D. Blau and 
Lawrence M. Kahn 2006) and the one against controlling for graduate degree when 
studying the return to college quality (Dominic J. Brewer, Eric R. Eide and Ronald G. 
Ehrenberg 1999; Liang Zhang 2005). 
B. Decomposing the Bias in Previous Studies 
The standard econometric approach is to run a regression of wages on foreign 
education, controlling for exogenous characteristics at the time of migration.  To fix 
ideas, suppose that the true model is Equation (2) and that the error term and foreign 
education are uncorrelated.  Throughout this section, I abstract from all other control 
variables.  Using the ordinary least squares estimator, the probability limit of the 
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coefficient on foreign education is shown in Equation (3) – the model is correctly 
specified, and the estimator is unbiased.  The Technical Appendix presents the 
derivations of all equations used in this paper. 
εαα ++= 10 fEY  (2) 
11ˆlim αα =p  (3) 
In practice, however, scholars are subject to a data limitation that generates a 
specific form of measurement error in foreign education.  Workhorse datasets such as 
the U.S. Census, the American Community Survey, and the CPS basic monthly survey 
do not contain data on education by country of origin.  Beginning with Chiswick 
(1978), the standard approach is to calculate foreign education ( )fE  using total 
education ( )T  and age at arrival ( )A  with the piecewise function in Equation (4).
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For example, an immigrant who arrived at age 20 years with 12 years of total 
education earned all 12 years abroad; an immigrant who arrived at age 20 years with 
16 years of total education earned only 14 years abroad and two years of schooling in 
the United States. 
 (4) 
To simplify the analysis, and to ensure that migration does not interrupt 
                                                 
 
10 A second source of measurement error is caused by the interval reporting of year of 
arrival, which generates attenuation bias in the ordinary least squares estimator.  More 
recent studies use datasets that report year of arrival in years rather than in intervals 
(Randall K. Q. Akee and Mutlu Yuksel 2008; Rachel M. Friedberg 2000).  A third 
source of measurement error is due to multiple trip-taking to the United States (Ilana 
Redstone and Douglas S. Massey 2004). 
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schooling and thus censor foreign education, I restrict my attention to the top part of 
the function.  Measurement error in this range is due to the misclassification of all 
domestic education as foreign education since foreign education is equal to total 
education.  This error can be thought of as a linear restriction that forces the returns to 
foreign education and domestic education to be equal.  To see its effect on the return 
to foreign education, assume that the econometric specification is Equation (5) and 
Equation (6) and that domestic education is exogenous.  Let 2α  be the coefficient on 
domestic education in the unrestricted regression with foreign education and domestic 
education as independent variables.  As seen in Equation (7), if domestic education is 
more valuable in the domestic labor market than foreign education ( )12 αα > , then the 
measurement error generates upward bias in the return to foreign education.  If 
domestic education is less valuable than foreign education ( )12 αα < , then the 
measurement error leads to downward bias in the return to foreign education.  Because 
most studies present evidence that the return to foreign education is less than the 
return to domestic education (Bernt Bratsberg and James F. Jr Ragan 2002; Rachel M. 
Friedberg 2000; Robert F. Schoeni 1997; James B. Stewart and Thomas Hyclak 1984), 
the piecewise function of total education and age at arrival leads to upward bias in the 
return to foreign education. 
νδδ ++= *10 fEY  (5) 
dff EETE +==
*
 (6) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )df
d
EE
Ep
varvar
varˆlim 1211 +
−+= αααδ
 (7) 
A second econometric problem is model misspecification.  While the research 
objective is to determine the overall causal effect of foreign education on wages in the 
domestic labor market, scholars instead estimate regressions of wages on foreign 
education that control for domestic education (Julian R. Betts and Magnus Lofstrom 
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2000; Bernt Bratsberg and James F. Jr Ragan 2002; Rachel M. Friedberg 2000; Robert 
F. Schoeni 1997).  The inclusion of domestic education as a control variable leads to 
bias in the return to foreign education if it is endogenous.  Indeed, Duleep and Regets 
(1999) argue that it is exactly the difference in the returns to foreign education and 
domestic education that causes post-migration educational investment. 
To understand this potential problem, suppose that Equation (2) is the true 
model, but that instead we estimate Equation (8).  Now, assume that foreign education 
is not subject to measurement error caused by the piecewise function in Equation (4).  
In this case, the coefficient on foreign education has the probability limit shown in 
Equation (10), where the bias depends on the relationship between domestic education 
and foreign education ( )1τ  and the coefficient from the regression of the wage 
residuals ( )ε  on the domestic education investment residuals ( )υ . 
ψλλλ +++= 210 df EEY  (8) 
υττ ++= fd EE 10  (9) 
( )
( )υ
υεταλ
var
,covˆlim 111 −=p
 (10) 
It is likely that the rightmost term in Equation (10) is positive because 
unobservables that lead to greater investment in human capital are also likely to lead 
to greater wages.  Thus, if less-skilled immigrants have greater investment in domestic 
education ( )01 <τ , controlling for domestic education biases the return to foreign 
education upward.  On the other hand, if more-skilled immigrants have greater 
investment in domestic education ( )01 >τ , controlling for domestic education biases 
the return to foreign education downward.  There is substantial disagreement over the 
empirical relationship between foreign and domestic education, with some arguing 
that it is negative (George J. Borjas 1982; Aliya Hashmi Khan 1997) and others that it 
is positive (Ilana Redstone Akresh 2007; Barry R. Chiswick and Paul W. Miller 1994; 
Deborah Cobb-Clark, Marie D. Connolly and Christopher Worswick 2005), so the 
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effect of misspecification bias, and thus the total bias in previous studies, is of 
ambiguous direction. 
III. Data and Research Design 
A. Data Construction 
To estimate the corrected return to foreign education, I use the Current 
Population Survey, which is a monthly survey of households in the United States.  The 
basic monthly survey includes information on total education, demographic 
characteristics, and labor supply for household members.  Each household is 
interviewed for four months, on break for eight months, and then re-interviewed for 
four months.  Households units have staggered months of entry, so that each month, 
one-eighth of the sample is in the first month in sample, one-eighth of the sample is in 
the second month in sample, and so on, up to one-eighth of the sample in the eighth 
and last month in sample. 
The CPS is useful for estimating the return to foreign education because 
immigrants report schooling earned in the United States in the 1995, 1999, and 2004 
October Supplements.  I calculate foreign education as the difference between total 
education and domestic education rather than compute it with the piecewise function 
of total education and age at arrival.  Total education is reported in intervals, so I set 
education as 0 for less than one year, 2.5 for one to four years, 5.5 for five or six years, 
7.5 for seven or eight years, 9 for 9 years, 10 for 10 years, 11 for 11 years, 12 for 12 
years or high school graduate, 13 for some college, 14 for associate degree, 16 for 
bachelor's degree, and 18 for master's degree, professional school degree, or doctorate 
degree (David A. Jaeger 1997).  In contrast, domestic education (for immigrants) is 
reported as years of school attended in the United States.  I cap domestic education at 
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total education and drop a small number of observations with missing domestic 
education or with negative foreign education.11
The wage data in the basic monthly survey is only available for households in 
the fourth and eighth months in sample, which are called the Outgoing Rotation 
Groups.  I use the longitudinal feature of the CPS to match household members 
between the October Supplements and the nearest Outgoing Rotation Groups in the 
October, November, December, and January basic monthly surveys.
 
12  For example, a 
household in October 1995 in its second month in sample is interviewed again in 
December 1995 when it is in its fourth month in sample.  Because the CPS follows 
households rather than people, longitudinal matches may incorrectly link two different 
people together.  I follow Madrian and Lefgren (2000) and condition matches on age 
within two years, sex, and race and ethnicity, as well as on country of birth, mother’s 
and father’s countries of birth, employment status, and sector of work for a match rate 
of 79.5 percent.13
                                                 
 
11 Of the eligible 4,356 immigrants in the October Supplements, 112 are dropped for 
missing domestic education, 17 have domestic education capped at total education, 
and 48 are dropped because their foreign education is less than zero, for a total of 
4,196 immigrants eligible to be matched to the basic monthly surveys. 
  The sample in this paper is based on the October Supplements with 
its population weights.  Panel attrition in the form of non-matches between the 
October Supplements and the basic monthly surveys causes missing data on wages, 
12 I do not link respondents to one year forward or backward since the match rates are 
lower and school enrollment during the time elapsed will lead to measurement error in 
domestic education. 
13 Non-matches are also caused by having trimmed hourly wages. 
58 
 
and I drop these respondents from the sample. 
I deflate the wage data into 2000 dollars and follow Lemieux (2006) by using 
hourly wage if it is available.  For all other workers, I use CPS calculated weekly 
wage divided by usual hours worked last week.  CPS weekly wages are subject to top-
codes that vary over time, so I impose the minimum common top code across all years 
($2021.57 in 2000 dollars) on the data and replace top-coded wages with 1.4 times the 
new top code.  As for usual hours, respondents may report “hours vary,” so I impute 
their labor supply using regressions of usual hours on actual hours, number of jobs, 
and part-time labor supply by sex, basic monthly survey month-year, and nativity type. 
The sample consists of immigrant and native men to abstract away from 
selective labor force participation among women.  I define immigrants as foreign-born 
and natives as United States-born with both parents born in the United States.  I also 
restrict the sample to workers in the wage and salary sector, and I exclude respondents 
living in group quarters and immigrants with missing years since migration. 
The final sample restriction is due to a migration timing problem that is rarely 
made explicit.  Immigrants with interrupted schooling, such as people who migrate as 
children and people who come on F1 student visas, have censored values of foreign 
education.  It is difficult to know how much foreign education they would have gotten 
if they stayed in their countries of birth.  Thus, their domestic education is the sum of 
schooling they would have earned in the source country and schooling they would 
have earned as a result of their economic condition at migration.  There are two 
general approaches to dealing with this problem: (1) restricting the sample to 
immigrants with sufficient time to complete their foreign education using age at 
arrival (Julian R. Betts and Magnus Lofstrom 2000; Aliya Hashmi Khan 1997), and 
(2) using data on immigrant visa type (Barry R. Chiswick and Paul W. Miller 1994; 
Deborah Cobb-Clark, Marie D. Connolly and Christopher Worswick 2005).  Due to 
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the data limitations of the CPS, I restrict the sample to first-generation immigrants 
who were at least 25 years old when they arrived.  Conveniently, this restriction means 
that according to the piecewise function in Equation (7), foreign education is equal to 
total education. 
Table 11. Sample Means and Standard Deviations 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 Immigrants Natives   Immigrants Natives 
ln(Hourly wage) 2.552 2.768  Potential total  25.686 21.802 
 (0.634) (0.555)  work experience (10.815) (10.208) 
Hourly wage 15.974 18.646  Potential foreign  16.223 – 
 (12.379) (11.632)  work experience (8.698)  
Labor hours per  41.358 43.108  Years since  10.441 – 
week (7.826) (8.398)  migration (8.240)  
Total education 12.329 13.675  Arrived 1900– 0.025 – 
 (4.626) (2.326)  1969 (0.155)  
Foreign education 11.352 –  Arrived 1970– 0.391 – 
 (4.668)   1989 (0.488)  
Domestic  0.250 1.000  Arrived 1990– 0.584 – 
education>0 (0.433) (0.016)  2009 (0.493)  
Domestic  0.977 13.675  Citizen 0.300 – 
education (2.536) (2.326)   (0.458)  
White 0.231 0.844  Married 0.708 0.694 
 (0.422) (0.363)   (0.455) (0.461) 
Black 0.086 0.110  Number of  0.871 0.801 
 (0.280) (0.313)  children (1.133) (1.096) 
Hispanic 0.434 0.032  Number of adults 2.612 2.152 
 (0.496) (0.177)   (1.194) (0.757) 
Asian or Pacific  0.244 0.005  Metropolitan 0.955 0.800 
Islander (0.429) (0.068)   (0.208) (0.400) 
Other race 0.006 0.009  N 3337 50981 
 (0.074) (0.092)     
Sources: Current Population Survey in 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2004, and 2005. 
Notes: The sample consists of men in the October Supplements with matches in the 
basic monthly surveys, between ages 25 and 64 years old, without missing or negative 
foreign education, and in the wage and salary sector with hourly wage between $1 and 
$100 in 2000 dollars.  Natives are U.S. born with U.S. born parents, and immigrants are 
foreign-born whose ages at arrival are at least 25 years old. 
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Table 11 presents the sample means and standard deviations for immigrants 
and natives.  The average hourly wage for immigrants is $2.7 less than that of natives, 
although both groups have similar usual hours worked per week.  The average total 
education among immigrants is 12.3 years, which is all of foreign origin according the 
piecewise function of total education and age at arrival.  The data in the October 
Supplements rejects this assumption, with 25 percent of immigrants having attended 
school in the United States.  The new measure shows that on average, immigrants only 
have 11.4 years of foreign education, with an additional 1.0 years of education earned 
after migration. 
The descriptive statistics also show that immigrants are more likely to be 
Hispanic or Asian and Pacific Islander.  For immigrants, I focus on potential foreign 
work experience rather than age because it provides a more straightforward 
interpretation of years since migration – controlling for potential foreign work 
experience implies that an additional year since migration is associated with an 
additional year in age, while controlling for age implies that an additional year since 
migration is associated with a one year decrease in the age at arrival.14
                                                 
 
14 Age is equal to six plus foreign education plus potential foreign work experience 
plus years since migration. 
  Immigrants 
have more potential total work experience than natives, which is partly due to their 
lower total education and partly due to their younger age.  Most of the immigrants in 
the sample arrived between 1970 and 2000, a period in which cohort differences have 
been shown to affect immigrant wages (George J. Borjas 1985; George J. Borjas 
1995).  As for family composition, immigrants are equally likely to be married but are 
more likely to live in larger households than natives.  Immigrants are also more likely 
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to live in metropolitan areas.  The distribution of their countries of birth is presented in 
Table 12.  I reassign immigrants from countries with less than 20 observations to the 
appropriate geographical residual code in the CPS.15
Table 12. Immigrant Countries of Birth 
  As expected, the largest group of 
immigrants in the sample consists of people born in Mexico, followed by people born 
in the Philippines, India, China, and then El Salvador.  There are stark differences in 
the amount of foreign education by country, ranging from a low of 7.5 years of foreign 
education for Guatemalan immigrants to a high of 15.3 years of foreign education for 
Russian immigrants. 
Country N ln(Hourly 
wage) 
Hourly 
wage 
Foreign 
education 
Domestic 
education>0 
Domestic 
education 
Mexico 698 2.185 9.846 7.925 0.142 0.422 
Philippines 205 2.667 17.154 13.367 0.193 0.966 
India 181 2.993 23.664 14.746 0.355 1.611 
China 170 2.796 21.121 13.300 0.450 1.747 
El Salvador 95 2.259 10.684 7.621 0.160 0.358 
Canada 88 3.181 27.716 13.858 0.246 1.557 
Cuba 88 2.348 12.245 11.441 0.112 0.311 
Dom. Rep.  81 2.275 11.702 9.474 0.157 0.632 
Vietnam 80 2.551 14.760 11.417 0.382 1.075 
Russia 72 2.806 19.474 15.302 0.184 0.643 
Poland 68 2.595 14.806 13.063 0.132 0.508 
England 58 3.324 32.397 14.338 0.291 1.747 
Haiti 57 2.313 11.509 10.747 0.273 1.027 
South Korea 56 2.807 19.872 14.135 0.285 1.455 
Guatemala 55 2.166 9.426 7.547 0.068 0.113 
Colombia 49 2.544 14.405 11.934 0.308 1.063 
Peru 46 2.413 12.758 12.402 0.329 1.286 
                                                 
 
15 I also combine the residual North America with Elsewhere (includes country not 
known) because it has less than 20 observations. 
62 
 
Table 12 (Continued).  
Puerto Rico 44 2.452 13.613 9.211 0.266 1.892 
Jamaica 42 2.522 13.347 10.698 0.263 1.058 
Taiwan 42 3.070 26.096 14.285 0.538 1.721 
Honduras 37 2.280 10.773 9.312 0.108 0.477 
Japan 36 3.496 36.942 15.135 0.177 0.590 
Germany 35 3.232 29.267 15.222 0.276 1.005 
Guyana 33 2.480 13.169 10.312 0.329 1.485 
Ecuador 30 2.193 9.927 10.615 0.268 0.721 
Brazil 27 2.536 15.450 12.083 0.206 0.934 
Ukraine 27 2.616 16.218 13.645 0.259 0.588 
Iran 25 2.961 23.059 14.200 0.446 1.601 
France 22 3.076 26.122 16.557 0.097 0.350 
Romania 20 2.519 13.505 12.963 0.496 1.898 
Nicaragua 20 2.408 12.492 10.812 0.208 1.300 
Pakistan 20 2.644 16.290 13.576 0.405 1.707 
Asia 134 2.619 16.487 12.988 0.341 1.092 
Carribean 31 2.560 15.714 10.779 0.405 1.806 
C. America 31 2.380 11.934 10.171 0.150 0.909 
Europe 148 2.884 23.005 13.095 0.258 0.919 
Middle East 35 2.892 22.308 12.956 0.417 1.886 
Other Africa 114 2.682 18.663 12.888 0.488 2.078 
Pacific Is.  38 2.793 22.106 13.215 0.388 1.383 
S. America 50 2.736 19.019 12.453 0.315 1.364 
Elsewhere  149 2.592 16.079 12.926 0.267 1.165 
Sources: Current Population Survey in 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2004, and 2005. 
The sample consists of men in the October Supplements with matches in the basic 
monthly surveys, between ages 25 and 64 years old, without missing or negative 
foreign education, and in the wage and salary sector with hourly wage between $1 
and $100 in 2000 dollars.  Natives are U.S. born with U.S. born parents, and 
immigrants are foreign-born whose ages at arrival are at least 25 years old. 
Figure 3 shows three non-parametric relationships between education and 
natural log hourly wages with local linear regressions.  The solid line shows a positive 
association between domestic education and wages among natives, with a slightly 
greater slope among people with at least 11 or 12 years of school.  As for immigrants, 
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there are two important takeaways from the figure.  The first is that the slope of the 
dashed line for immigrant foreign education is flatter than the solid line for native 
domestic education, which implies a lower return to foreign education among 
immigrants than the return to domestic education among natives.  The second is that 
the dashed line for foreign education is almost always above the dotted line for 
immigrant total education.  Thus, for a given level of education, immigrants with only 
foreign education earn more than immigrants with some foreign education and some 
domestic education. 
 
Figure 3. Local Linear Regressions of Wages on Education 
Figure 4 presents the relationship between foreign education and domestic 
education among immigrants.  The solid line for the fraction that attended school in 
the United States as a function of foreign education does not suggest any meaningful 
trend.  It is unclear why there is a local maximum at 10 years of school, but one 
1
.8
2
2
.2
2
.4
2
.6
2
.8
3
3
.2
3
.4
ln
(h
o
u
rl
y
 w
ag
e)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
E ducation
D om e sti c edu ca tio n, n at ive s
F ore ig n ed uc ation,  im m igran ts
T ota l educ at ion , im m igra nt s
S ourc es :  C urre nt P opulati on S urve y in  199 5, 1 996 , 19 99, 2000 , 2 004,  a nd 2 005.
N ote s : T h e sa m ple  c ons is ts  of m e n in  t he  O ctobe r S up ple m ent s  w i th m atc he s  in  th e bas i c m on thly surve ys , be tw e en  
age s  25  a nd 6 4 ye ars  o ld, wi th out m iss ing  or n ega tive foreign ed uc ation, an d in  th e w a ge  and  sa lar y sec tor w ith hou rly 
w age  be tw e en  $1  and  $10 0 in  2 000  doll ars .   N a tive s  a re U .S . bor n w ith U . S . b orn pa re nt s , an d im m igra nt s  are  fo reig n-
born  w hose  age s  a t a rri val  ar e a t lea s t 25 ye ars  o ld.
64 
 
possible explanation is that immigrants misunderstand the question about domestic 
education as one about total education.  The dashed line shows unconditional average 
years of domestic education as the dependent variable, which is mostly downward 
sloping – immigrants with less foreign education have more domestic education than 
immigrants with more foreign education.  Lastly, the dotted line shows the average 
years of domestic education conditional on having any domestic education as the 
dependent variable, and again, immigrants with less foreign education make greater 
investments in domestic education. 
 
Figure 4. Local Linear Regressions of Domestic Education on Foreign Education 
These figures suggest that the measurement error and model misspecification 
in previous studies both lead to downward bias in the estimated return to foreign 
education.  However, since they do not control for other important variables that vary 
among immigrants, I turn next to parametric analyses to hold these factors constant. 
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B. Research Design 
As a preliminary analysis, I first estimate the relationship between domestic 
and foreign education among immigrants using Equation (11).  The dependent 
variable is either (1) having any domestic education or (2) domestic education, and I 
use logistic and ordinary least squares estimators, respectively.  In the latter case, the 
parameter 1γ  corresponds to 1τ  in Equation (9), which allows me to sign the bias from 
over-controlling the econometric specification with domestic education.  In the 
baseline specification, I control for a vector of exogenous variables, X, which consists 
of potential foreign work experience, years since migration, and cohort fixed effects 
for immigrants and potential domestic work experience for natives.  I also use 
specifications that add a vector of potentially endogenous variables in Z1, which 
consists of citizenship (only for immigrants), married, number of children in the 
household, number of adults in the household, residence in a metropolitan area, and 
Census division fixed effects.  These variables are potentially endogenous because 
they take place at the time of the survey rather than at the time of migration.  The error 
term includes basic monthly survey fixed effects (October 1995 to January 2004) and 
country of birth fixed effects (only for immigrants). 
( ) ( )νγγγγ ++++Λ= 13210 ZXfd EEf  (11) 
I use similarly specified wage models as shown in Equation (12), one with the 
exogenous controls only and one that adds the potentially endogenous controls.  The 
only difference is that the wage equations also control for part-time employment and 
union coverage as potentially endogenous control variables in Z2, which are likely to 
affect wages but irrelevant for domestic educational investment.  For comparison, I 
also estimate the wage specifications separately for natives, with a focus on the return 
to domestic education and controlling for potential domestic work experience.  In 
addition to estimating the wage models for immigrants, I also estimate them separately 
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for natives for comparison with the focus on the return to domestic education and 
control for potential domestic work experience.  Note that the basic monthly survey 
fixed effects controls for common labor market conditions across all workers in each 
group.  As extensions, I also experiment with non-linear specifications of foreign 
education given the graphical evidence presented in Figure 3. 
µβββββ +++++= 2413210ln ZZXfEw  (12) 
One major concern with this identification strategy is the potential bias from 
selective emigration.  Ideally, the sample consists of all immigrants who chose to 
migrate.  Instead, the data only contains information on immigrants who are still in the 
United States at the time of the survey.  Previous studies document substantial 
emigration that varies by demographic characteristics and country of birth (e.g. 
Jennifer Van Hook, et al. 2006).  Indeed, estimates from longitudinal Social Security 
Administration data show lower assimilation rates than those based on cross-sectional 
data (Darren Lubotsky 2007).  To the extent that emigration is negatively correlated 
with foreign education, previous estimates of the return to foreign education, and the 
ones in this paper, are upper bounds on the true return to foreign education. 
IV. The Endogeneity of Domestic Education 
Table 13 presents the results of the domestic education investment models.  
Column (1) shows the average marginal effects from a logistic regression with having 
attended school in the United States as the dependent variable.  Each year of foreign 
education is associated with a 2.9 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
having any domestic education.  This result is similar to Khan’s (1997) analysis of the 
1976 Survey of Income and Education, but the advantages of the 1995, 1999, and 
2004 October Supplements are that they are much more recent and that allow me to 
include cohort fixed effects.  Immigrants with greater potential foreign work 
experience are less likely to have attended school in the United States, which may 
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reflect greater opportunity costs of school enrollment. 
Table 13. Immigrant Investment in Domestic Education 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Domestic education>0  Domestic education 
 Logistic average 
marginal effects 
 Ordinary least squares 
Foreign education -0.029** -0.030**  -0.316** -0.327** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.024) (0.024) 
Potential foreign work  -0.006** -0.005**  -0.027** -0.028** 
experience (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Years since migration 0.003 0.000  0.007 -0.013 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.010) (0.011) 
Arrived 1900–1969 0.006 0.034  0.061 0.176 
 (0.068) (0.072)  (0.441) (0.441) 
Arrived 1970–1989 -0.010 -0.006  -0.061 0.001 
 (0.029) (0.029)  (0.155) (0.155) 
Citizen  0.099**   0.674** 
  (0.022)   (0.124) 
Married  0.013   0.145 
  (0.021)   (0.111) 
Number of children  0.004   -0.044 
  (0.008)   (0.042) 
Number of adults  -0.048**   -0.230** 
  (0.008)   (0.037) 
Metropolitan  0.120**   0.446* 
  (0.040)   (0.233) 
Other Control: No Yes  No Yes 
N 3337 3337  3337 3337 
Log likelihood -1646.177 -1580.338  -7355.279 -7299.037 
R-squared    0.252 0.277 
Sources: Current Population Survey in 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2004, and 
2005. 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05.  The sample consists of men in the October 
Supplements with matches in the basic monthly surveys, between ages 25 
and 64 years old, without missing or negative foreign education, and in the 
wage and salary sector with hourly wage between $1 and $100 in 2000 
dollars.  Natives are U.S. born with U.S. born parents, and immigrants are 
foreign-born whose ages at arrival are at least 25 years old.  All 
specifications include basic monthly survey fixed effects and country 
fixed effects.  Specifications 2 and 4 include Census division fixed effects. 
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The second column presents the specification that includes potentially 
endogenous control variables.  Again, each year of foreign education decreases the 
probability of having any domestic education by 3.0 percentage points.  All else equal, 
citizens are 9.9 percentage points more likely to have attended school after migration, 
perhaps because they are more committed to staying in the United States.  Residents of 
metropolitan areas are also 12.0 percentage points more likely to have attended school 
in the United States, which is likely due to the greater availability of local colleges. 
The right panel presents the ordinary least squares regressions with domestic 
education as the dependent variable.  The results are qualitatively similar to the 
logistic average marginal effect estimates.  Each additional year of foreign education 
is associated with a 0.32 year decrease in domestic education.  Potential foreign work 
experience is also negatively associated with domestic education, with each year of 
experience being associated with 0.027 less years of domestic education.  The results 
are similar when I include the set of potentially endogenous control variables.  Like 
the logistic regression average marginal effects, citizenship and metropolitan residence 
are positively associated with years of domestic education. 
One concern with defining foreign education as the difference between total 
education and domestic education is presence of classical measurement error in total 
education and domestic education (Barry R. Chiswick and Paul W. Miller 1994).  This 
may be due to the interval reporting of total education in the basic monthly survey, 
part-time school enrollment, or grade retention.  In this case, the coefficient on foreign 
education is biased downward as shown in Equation (13), where dθ  is the 
measurement error in domestic education.  The problem here is that the variance of the 
measurement error may be large enough to produce a negative relationship between 
foreign education and domestic education in the data when the actual relationship is 
positive. 
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To assess the importance of this problem, I use a reliability ratio of 0.88 from 
Ashenfelter and Card (1994) and estimate that the variance of the measurement error 
in domestic education is 0.88.16
In results not shown here but available upon request, I estimate specifications 
that control for race and ethnicity fixed effects and find similar results.  I also estimate 
regressions with domestic education as the dependent variable among immigrants who 
have attended school in the United States.  Since the results are qualitatively similar to 
those in the left panel of 
  Equation (13) implies that the coefficient on foreign 
education without measurement error is equal to -0.27, compared to -0.32 with the 
measurement error.  While there is attenuation bias in the first term, the second term 
decreases the coefficient estimate by 0.12.  Thus, classical measurement error in total 
education and domestic education does bias the relationship between domestic 
education and foreign education, but it is not a critical problem because the absolute 
magnitude of the bias is small. 
Table 13, I estimate tobit models and find again that foreign 
education and domestic education are negatively correlated.  In these specifications, 
each year of foreign education is associated with a decrease of almost half a year of 
domestic education. 
Overall, the results indicate that domestic education is indeed endogenous.  
Consistent with two of the three previous studies of immigrants in the United States 
(George J. Borjas 1982; Aliya Hashmi Khan 1997), I show that the relationship 
between foreign education and domestic education is negative – less-skilled 
immigrants have more domestic education than highly-skilled immigrants, all else 
                                                 
 
16 The variance of the measurement error is (1-0.88)/0.88*2.5362=0.88. 
70 
 
equal.  This relationship implies that over-controlling for domestic education in wage 
regressions will lead to upward bias in the return to foreign education. 
V. Foreign Education in the United States Labor Market 
This section presents the biased and unbiased estimates of the return to foreign 
education.  Column (1) of Table 14 presents the estimates for natives as a comparison 
to the immigrant sample.  The return to domestic education is 11.3 percent, which is in 
line with the previous estimates in the literature.  There is also a positive return to 
potential domestic work experience at 0.90 percent per year.  The second column adds 
the potentially endogenous control variables, and as expected, married men and men 
living in metropolitan areas earn higher wages than single men and men outside 
metropolitan areas, respectively.  The return to domestic education in this specification 
is largely unchanged at 10.4 percent. 
How do the estimates from the CPS compare to previous estimates of the 
return to foreign education?  Column (3) replicates the standard specification in 
previous studies by using the piecewise function of total education and age at arrival 
to compute foreign education.  Because the sample consists of immigrants whose age 
at arrival is at least 25 years old, the piecewise function assumes that total education is 
foreign education.  In this case, the return to foreign education is 5.8 percent, which is 
less half than the return domestic education for natives.  This estimate is in line with 
previous estimates based on data from the U.S. Census (Julian R. Betts and Magnus 
Lofstrom 2000; Barry R. Chiswick 1978; Robert F. Schoeni 1997).  Each additional 
year since migration is associated with a 1.1 percent wage increase, although this is 
biased upward due to emigration bias (Darren Lubotsky 2007).  In contrast to previous 
studies (George J. Borjas 1985; George J. Borjas 1995), there is no evidence of cohort 
differences in wages, although this is likely due to small sample size.  Controlling for 
potentially endogenous control variables in column (4) does not have a sizable effect 
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on the return to foreign education.  Among the additional control variables, married 
men earn 5.7 percent more than single men, and the point estimates suggest wage 
premiums for citizen and metropolitan but are not statistically significant. 
To understand the bias from the measurement error problem first, columns (5) 
and (6) estimate unrestricted models that control for foreign education and domestic 
education without using the piecewise function.  In the baseline case, the return to 
foreign education is 5.4 percent, and under the assumption of exogenous domestic 
education, the return to domestic education is 6.8 percent.  The results show that the 
measurement error generates upward bias in the return to foreign education because 
the return to domestic education is greater than the return to foreign education.  
However, the magnitude of the measurement error bias is small in part because the 
variance of domestic education is small relative to the variance of foreign education. 
The final two columns exclude domestic education from the specification to 
analyze the remaining bias from including it as an endogenous control variable.  
Column (7) shows that the corrected return to foreign education is only 3.3 percent in 
the baseline specification.  The overall return to foreign education is lower than the 
estimates that only correct for measurement error because foreign education and 
domestic education are negatively associated.  As expected, the regression of the wage 
residuals on the domestic education investment residuals give a coefficient of 0.068, 
which means that unobservables that lead to greater domestic education also lead to 
greater wages.  Column (8) shows that the corrected return to foreign education is 
largely unchanged after including the potentially endogenous control variables at 3.1 
percent.  In this specification, citizenship is associated a 5.9 percent wage increase, as 
is marital status and metropolitan status at 7.4 percent and 9.7 percent, respectively. 
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Table 14. Decomposing the Bias in the Return to Foreign Education 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 ln(Hourly wage) 
 Natives  Immigrants 
Domestic education 0.113** 0.104**    
 (0.001) (0.001)    
Total education    0.058** 0.057** 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Potential domestic  0.009** 0.009**    
work experience (0.000) (0.000)    
Potential foreign work     0.002 0.003* 
experience    (0.001) (0.001) 
Years since migration    0.011** 0.010** 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Arrived 1900–1969    -0.064 -0.010 
    (0.088) (0.088) 
Arrived 1970–1989    -0.027 -0.027 
    (0.036) (0.036) 
Citizen     0.018 
     (0.025) 
Married  0.129**   0.057** 
  (0.006)   (0.025) 
Number of children  0.033**   0.015 
  (0.002)   (0.010) 
Number of adults  -0.027**   -0.021** 
  (0.003)   (0.009) 
Metropolitan  0.131**   0.065 
  (0.006)   (0.042) 
Other Control: No Yes  No Yes 
R-squared 0.229 0.287  0.380 0.394 
Sources: Current Population Survey in 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2004, and 2005. 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05.  The sample consists of men in the October 
Supplements with matches in the basic monthly surveys, between ages 25 and 
64 years old, without missing or negative foreign education, and in the wage and 
salary sector with hourly wage between $1 and $100 in 2000 dollars.  Natives 
are U.S. born with U.S. born parents, and immigrants are foreign-born whose 
ages at arrival are at least 25 years old.  All specifications include basic monthly 
survey fixed effects, and all immigrant specifications include country fixed 
effects.  Specifications 2, 4, 6, and 8 also control for part-time and union 
coverage and include Census division fixed effects. 
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Table 14 (Continued). 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ln(Hourly wage) 
 Immigrants 
Domestic education 0.068** 0.067**   
 (0.004) (0.004)   
Foreign education 0.054** 0.053** 0.033** 0.031** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Potential foreign work  0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
experience (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Years since migration 0.010** 0.009** 0.011** 0.008** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Arrived 1900–1969 -0.067 -0.013 -0.062 -0.003 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.095) (0.094) 
Arrived 1970–1989 -0.029 -0.028 -0.033 -0.028 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
Citizen  0.013  0.059** 
  (0.025)  (0.027) 
Married  0.064**  0.074** 
  (0.025)  (0.026) 
Number of children  0.012  0.009 
  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Number of adults  -0.019**  -0.035** 
  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Metropolitan  0.067  0.097** 
  (0.042)  (0.044) 
Other Control: No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.382 0.397 0.326 0.344 
Thus, the corrected estimates of the return to foreign education are about half 
the size of the estimates in previous studies, and only one-third the size of the return to 
domestic education among natives.  These results indicate that foreign education is 
much less valuable in the United States labor market than previously thought.  Part of 
the difference is that previous studies misattribute domestic education as foreign 
education, but the more important reason empirically is that the econometric 
specifications that over-control for domestic education. 
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Table 15. Non-Linear Returns to Education for Natives and Immigrants 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ln(Hourly wage) 
 Natives  Immigrants 
Dom. ed. 0.043** 0.030**      
 (0.006) (0.006)      
Dom. ed.≥12  -0.693** -0.767**      
 (0.066) (0.063)      
Dom. ed. *  0.072** 0.077**      
Dom. ed.≥12 (0.007) (0.006)      
Tot. ed.    0.018** 0.015**   
    (0.005) (0.005)   
Tot. ed.≥12     -1.069** -1.108**   
    (0.084) (0.084)   
Tot. ed. *     0.092** 0.096**   
Tot. ed.≥12    (0.007) (0.007)   
For. ed.       0.010** 0.007 
      (0.005) (0.005) 
For. ed.≥12       -0.891** -0.896** 
      (0.099) (0.099) 
For. ed. *       0.073** 0.075** 
For. ed.≥12      (0.008) (0.008) 
Other Control: No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.232 0.290  0.415 0.431 0.349 0.367 
Sources: Current Population Survey in 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2004, and 2005. 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05.  The sample consists of men in the October 
Supplements with matches in the basic monthly surveys, between ages 25 and 64 
years old, without missing or negative foreign education, and in the wage and 
salary sector with hourly wage between $1 and $100 in 2000 dollars.  Natives are 
U.S. born with U.S. born parents, and immigrants are foreign-born whose ages at 
arrival are at least 25 years old.  All specifications include basic monthly survey 
fixed effects, all native specifications control for potential domestic work 
experience, and all immigrant specifications control for potential foreign work 
experience and years since migration and include cohort and country fixed effects.  
Specifications 2, 4, and 6 also control for citizen (only for immigrants), married, 
number of children, number of adults, metropolitan, part-time and union coverage 
and include Census division fixed effects.  Dom. ed. is domestic education, Tot. 
ed. is total education, and for. ed. is foreign education.  
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Table 16. Quantile Regression Estimates for the Return to Education 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 ln(Hourly wage) 
 Natives  Immigrants 
 25th 50th 75th  25th 50th 75th 
Domestic  0.093** 0.107** 0.119**     
education (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)     
Foreign      0.014** 0.031** 0.034** 
education     (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Potential  0.007** 0.010** 0.011**     
total exp. (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Potential      -0.004** -0.001 0.001 
foreign exp.     (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Years since      0.008** 0.007** 0.007** 
migration     (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Arrived      -0.035 0.091 0.066 
1900–1969     (0.083) (0.100) (0.051) 
Arrived      -0.041 -0.002 -0.010 
1970–1989     (0.035) (0.041) (0.022) 
Citizen     0.058** 0.080** 0.065** 
     (0.024) (0.028) (0.015) 
Married 0.145** 0.126** 0.117**  0.048** 0.054* 0.079** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.024) (0.028) (0.015) 
Number of  0.034** 0.035** 0.031**  0.012 0.010 0.019** 
children (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) 
Number of  -0.031** -0.026** -0.023**  -0.016* -0.028** -0.038** 
adults (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) 
Metropolitan 0.116** 0.140** 0.140**  0.124** 0.028 0.089** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.042) (0.051) (0.028) 
Other 
Controls: 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Sources: Current Population Survey in 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2004, and 2005. 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05.  The sample consists of men in the October Supplements 
with matches in the basic monthly surveys, between ages 25 and 64 years old, without 
missing or negative foreign education, and in the wage and salary sector with hourly 
wage between $1 and $100 in 2000 dollars.  Natives are U.S. born with U.S. born 
parents, and immigrants are foreign-born whose ages at arrival are at least 25 years 
old.  All specifications include basic monthly survey fixed effects, and all immigrant 
specifications include country fixed effects.  All specifications include Census 
division fixed effects. 
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Table 17. Sample Restrictions and Corrections for Attrition Bias 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 ln(Hourly wage) 
 Age at arrival≥16  Age at arrival≥25 
 All Potential 
foreign 
exp. >0 
Potential 
foreign 
exp.>5 
 All October 
only 
Inverse 
probability 
weights 
Foreign  0.024** 0.023** 0.023**  0.038** 0.037** 0.037** 
education (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Potential  -0.002* -0.002 -0.002  0.000 0.001 -0.000 
foreign exp. (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Years since  0.005** 0.005** 0.007**  0.008** 0.005 0.008** 
migration (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Arrived  0.035 0.011 -0.045  0.012 0.303* -0.008 
1900–1969 (0.058) (0.062) (0.073)  (0.096) (0.160) (0.096) 
Arrived  0.040 0.029 0.006  -0.030 -0.093 -0.028 
1970–1989 (0.026) (0.026) (0.030)  (0.038) (0.067) (0.039) 
Citizen 0.086** 0.089** 0.092**  0.054** 0.075 0.053** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.023)  (0.026) (0.049) (0.027) 
Married 0.110** 0.111** 0.089**  0.099** 0.146** 0.098** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.022)  (0.027) (0.050) (0.027) 
Number of  -0.005 -0.007 -0.009  0.001 0.020 -0.000 
children (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) 
Number of  -0.039** -0.040** -0.038**  -0.045** -0.048** -0.042** 
adults (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.017) (0.009) 
Metropolitan 0.126** 0.122** 0.106**  0.068 -0.041 0.064 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.032)  (0.044) (0.072) (0.045) 
Other 
Control: 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Mod. Spec.: No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.334 0.325 0.317  0.300 0.338 0.301 
Sources: Current Population Survey in 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2004, and 2005. 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05.  The sample consists of men in the October Supplements 
with matches in the basic monthly surveys, between ages 25 and 64 years old, without 
missing or negative foreign education, and in the wage and salary sector with hourly 
wage between $1 and $100 in 2000 dollars.  Natives are U.S. born with U.S. born 
parents, and immigrants are foreign-born whose ages at arrival are at least 16 or 25 
years old.  All specifications include basic monthly survey, country, and Census 
division fixed effects. 
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As an extension, I test for non-linear returns to education in Table 15.  
Conceptually, the return to education may exhibit nonlinearities if degrees signal 
productivity to employers via “sheepskin effects” or if worker responses to labor 
supply and demand shocks vary by schooling (James Heckman, Anne Layne-Farrar 
and Petra Todd 1996; Thomas Hungerford and Gary S. Solon 1987; David A. Jaeger 
and Marianne E. Page 1996).  Empirically, the local linear regressions in Figure 1 
suggest that the slope for natives changes at 11 or 12 years of schooling, which 
corresponds to the schooling required for high school completion.  The estimates in 
columns (1) and (2) confirm the presence of non-linear returns to domestic education 
for natives, with a return of 4.3 percent for workers with less than 12 years of 
schooling, compared to a return to 7.2 percent for workers with more than 12 years of 
schooling. 
The return to foreign education among immigrants need not be non-linear if 
employers do not recognize the “sheepskins” of foreign education systems.  Betts and 
Lofstrom (2000) and Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) both find evidence of a nonlinearity 
at 12 years of schooling, although both are subject to the measurement error and 
misspecification problems described above.  Using the uncorrected specification for 
immigrants, the CPS data shows a similar pattern, with the return to foreign education 
among the less educated at only 1.8 percent and at 9.2 percent for workers with at least 
12 years of school.  Surprisingly, while foreign education is less valuable than 
domestic education at the low end of the skill distribution, it is actually more valuable 
for immigrants with at least 12 years of schooling.  When I correct for measurement 
error and model misspecification, the return to foreign education for workers with less 
than 12 years of foreign education is 1.0 percent, while the return for workers with at 
least 12 years of foreign education is 7.3 percent.  Thus, the difference in the return to 
foreign education among immigrants and the return to domestic education among 
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natives is driven by differences in the value of education among workers with less 
than 12 years of schooling.  For those with at least 12 years of schooling, the return to 
foreign education among immigrants and the return to domestic education among 
natives are comparable. 
VI. Robustness Exercises 
In this section, I present results from four sets of robustness exercises that 
address some of the potential biases in the return to foreign education.  First, I estimate 
quantile regressions to (1) protect against the bias due to the top-coding of wages and 
(2) allow for the return to foreign education to vary at various points of the wage 
distribution.  The top-coding of wages may be particularly important here since many 
highly-skilled immigrants come to the United States under the H1-B visa program, 
particularly those in the high-paying technology industry. 
For comparison, the left panel of Table 16 presents the quantile regressions for 
natives at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the wage distribution.  The return to 
domestic education is 9.3 percent at the 25th percentile, increases to 10.7 percent at 
the 50th percentile, and then increase to 11.9 percent at the 75th percentile.  The right 
panel presents the estimates for immigrants based on specifications without 
measurement error from the piecewise function or with domestic education as an 
endogenous control variable.  The return to foreign education at the 25th percentile is 
1.4 percent, 3.1 percent at the 50th percentile, and 3.4 percent at the 75th percentile.  
There are two takeaways from this set of results.  First, the return to domestic 
education among natives and the return to foreign education among immigrants 
increase with the percentile of the wage distribution.  Potential explanations for these 
trends are that (1) workers at higher percentiles of the wage distribution have greater 
unobserved ability, which interacts positively with the return to schooling, (2) 
schooling and unobserved school quality are positively correlated, and (3) workers 
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with high levels of schooling are employed in jobs with low skill requirements (Pedro 
S. Martins and Pedro T. Pereira 2004).  Second, the estimates at the 50th percentile are 
similar to those from the ordinary least squares specifications, which indicate that the 
top-coding of wages does not cause any quantitatively meaningful bias in the returns 
to domestic and foreign education. 
The second robustness check is based on the selection of immigrants with 
uncensored foreign education.  Up to this point, the immigrant sample consists of 
people who were at least 25 years old when they arrived in the United States.  
However, many immigrants come at earlier ages but still have uncensored foreign 
education.  In the absence of data on immigrant visa type, there are two available 
alternatives using the CPS.  The first approach is to reduce the age at arrival criteria to 
allow additional immigrants into the sample.  The left panel of Table 17 shows the 
results using 16 years old at the time of migration as the new lower boundary.  As 
shown in column (1), the return to foreign education in the expanded sample is 2.4 
percent, which is lower than the return in the main sample.  This result indicates that 
the return to foreign education increases with age at arrival, which suggests that the 
timing of migration is endogenous. 
Because the expanded sample also adds immigrants with interrupted education, 
I restrict the sample further by imposing a potential foreign work experience 
condition.  The assumption here is that immigrants have continuous schooling and 
complete their foreign education once they take a break.  Column (2) shows results for 
immigrants who were at least age 16 years old when they arrived in the United States 
and who have at least one year of potential foreign work experience.  The return to 
foreign education is 2.3 percent, which is the same as the return without the 
experience constraint.  Expanding the criteria to more than five years of potential work 
experience does not change the estimated return to foreign education. 
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The third exercise is designed to study the panel attrition bias due to non-
matches between the October Supplements to the basic monthly surveys.  Respondents 
may not have wage data in November, December, and January months due to 
migration, death, or non-response (2000).  One solution is to limit the sample to only 
the October basic monthly survey since panel attrition would then not be issue.  A 
second solution is to reweight the October, November, December, and January 
samples to match the size of the original October sample, but doing so requires a 
modified specification with an abbreviated set of country fixed effects and without 
controlling for union coverage.  For comparison, column (4) presents the usual sample 
consisting of immigrants whose age at arrival is at least 25 years old with the modified 
specification.  The results indicate a slightly higher return to foreign education at 3.8 
percent.  Column (5) shows the results for the Outgoing Rotation Groups in October of 
1995, 1999, and 2004 only.  In this case, the return to foreign education is 
quantitatively similar at 3.7 percent.  The final column multiplies the sampling 
weights by inverse probability weights to correct for panel attrition bias.  Again, 
column (6) shows no effect of missing wage data on the estimated return to foreign 
education. 
The final robustness check assesses how classical measurement error affects 
the return to foreign education, both compared to previous studies and in the non-
linear schooling specifications.  First, I calculate the return to foreign education after 
accounting for classical measurement error in both total education and domestic 
education.  As shown in Equation (14), the probability limit of the coefficient on 
foreign education exhibits attenuation bias similar to the usual measurement error 
setup.  Note that the variance of foreign education with measurement error is given in 
Equation (15).  With an estimated return to foreign education with error at 3.3 percent, 
the true return to foreign education is slightly greater at 4.0 percent.  Thus, while 
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classical measurement error in total education and domestic education lead to 
attenuation bias in the return to foreign education, correcting for measurement error 
and misspecification bias still generates a return that is lower than estimates in 
previous studies and estimates of the return to domestic education among natives. 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )dTd
d
ET
ETp
θθ
βϕ
varvarvar
varˆlim 11 ++−
−
=
 (14) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dTdddT ETET θθθθ varvarvarvar ++−=−−+  (15) 
The second part of the exercise addresses the variation in classical 
measurement error as a function of total education.  As discussed above, respondents 
to the CPS basic monthly survey report total education as either 0 years, 1 to 4 years, 5 
to 6 years, 7 to 8 years, 9 years, 10 years, 11 years, 12 years, some college, 
undergraduate, or advanced degree.  This means that the measurement error in total 
education is largest for those with the lowest levels of total education.  Figure 5 shows 
the cumulative distribution function of schooling and demonstrates that while workers 
with less than eight years of school make up only 1.2 percent of natives, it makes up 
18.7 percent of immigrants.  Thus, one possible explanation for the difference between 
the return to foreign education and the return to domestic education among natives, as 
well as the nonlinearity of the return to foreign education among immigrants, is 
measurement error at the low end of the distribution of total education. 
It is difficult to get a convincing handle on the measurement error due to the 
interval-reporting of total education versus the measurement error from all other 
causes.17
                                                 
 
17 Unfortunately, the data used by Jaeger (1997) does not permit the disaggregation by 
nativity. 
  Instead, I argue that it is unlikely that (1) the return to foreign education 
equals the return to domestic education among immigrants, and that (2) the return to 
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foreign education among workers with less than 12 years of schooling equals the 
return to foreign education among workers with at least 12 years of schooling.  The 
first case requires a reliability ratio of 0.29, and the second case requires a reliability 
ratio of 0.14, both of which are arguably implausible given that the overall reliability 
ratio of total education is three and six times the size these requirements, respectively 
(Orley C. Ashenfelter and Alan B. Krueger 1994). 
 
Figure 5. Cumulative Distribution Functions for Education 
VII. Implications for Labor Economics and Immigration Policy 
The results of this paper show that the overall return to foreign education 
among immigrants is 3.3 percent per year.  This rate of return is less than one-third the 
return to domestic education among natives at 11.3 percent, which suggests that the 
foreign education is not as valued in the domestic labor market.  These results are 
robust to a variety of specifications that address the potential biases from the top-
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coding of wages, the selection of immigrants with uncensored foreign education, panel 
attrition in the CPS, and classical measurement error in domestic education and total 
education. 
My estimates are substantially lower than those in previous studies for two 
reasons.  First, previous studies calculate foreign education using a piecewise function 
of total education and age at arrival.  This approach generates upward bias in the 
return to foreign education because it misclassifies relatively more valuable domestic 
education as foreign education.  The size of the bias is small, partly because the 
difference in the returns to education is small and partly because the variance of 
domestic education is small relative to the variance of foreign education. 
The second reason why previous studies produce greater returns to foreign 
education is that they misspecify the econometric model by controlling for 
endogenous domestic education.  Part of the return to foreign education operates 
through additional investment after migration, and our research interest is in the 
overall value of foreign education the domestic labor market.  The CPS data show that 
it is immigrants with less foreign education who make greater investments in post-
migration human capital.  The negative correlation between foreign education and 
domestic education generates substantial upward bias in the return to foreign 
education when the specification over-controls for domestic education. 
Notably, non-linear specifications of foreign education indicate that the 
difference in the returns to education between immigrants and natives occur among 
workers with less than 12 years of school.  In this range, the return to domestic 
education among natives is 4.3 percent, while the corrected return to foreign education 
among immigrants is only 1.0 percent.  Surprisingly, the non-linear specifications 
suggest that the two returns to education among workers with at least 12 years of 
school are actually equal.  Subsequent studies will need to assess the extent to which 
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the observed differences in the returns to education are due to classical measurement 
error from interval-reported schooling. 
With this caveat in mind, the results have important implications for our 
understanding of the labor market.  A major cause of the immigrant-native wage gap is 
that foreign education among immigrants is less valued than domestic education 
among natives.  There are several potential explanations for this empirical result.  It 
may be that curriculums in foreign countries are not applicable in the domestic labor 
market, or that even with the same curriculum, schools in other countries are less 
effective than those in the United States.  An additional explanation is that employers 
are unable to recognize the quality of education from unfamiliar, foreign schools. 
The results also have important implications for federal immigration policy.  
Currently, policymakers are considering proposals to increase the fraction of 
immigrants admitted on the basis of human capital.  This proposal is motivated by 
concern over the net fiscal burden of immigration.  Proponents argue that less-
educated immigrants are more likely to rely on social services, so admitting highly-
educated immigrants decreases the net fiscal cost of immigration.  The results in this 
paper make two contributions to this policy arena.  First, selecting immigrants on the 
basis of foreign education is less likely to lead to higher immigrant wages than 
previously thought.  And second, the evidence in this paper suggests that this proposal 
is particularly unlikely to work among immigrants with less than 12 years of foreign 
education. 
VIII. Technical Appendix 
A. Correct Wage Specification 
Assume that the true model is Equation (A1) and that foreign education and the 
error term are uncorrelated.  Then the usual ordinary least squares estimator of the 
return to foreign education is unbiased. 
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B. Measurement Error and Exogenous Domestic Education 
In the measurement error case in Equation (A3) and Equation (A4), the 
econometric specification is still a regression of wages on foreign education.  
However, the proxy for foreign education is total education since the piecewise 
function assumes that all education for immigrants whose ages at arrival are at least 25 
years old is of foreign origin. 
νδδ ++= *10 fEY  (A3) 
dff EETE +==
*
 (A4) 
The bias in this specification is best understood by studying the regression of 
wages on both foreign education and domestic education shown in Equation (A5).  
First, note that the probability limit of the return to domestic education is given in 
Equation (A6). 
ωααα +++= df EEY 210  (A5) 
( )
( )d
d
E
EYp
var
,covˆlim 2 =α
 (A6) 
Thus, the probability limit of the measurement error specification is given in 
Equation (A7). 
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C. Domestic Education as an Endogenous Control Variable 
In the model misspecification case in Equation (A8), domestic education is 
included as a control variable that is endogenous.  The endogeneity of domestic 
education is shown in Equation (A9). 
ψλλλ +++= 210 df EEY  (A8) 
υττ ++= fd EE 10  (A9) 
Using the derivation from Angrist and Krueger (1999), the first step is to set up 
a partitioned regression using Equation (A10) and Equation (A11). 
ρηη ++= df EE 10  (A10) 
κππ ++= dEY 10  (A11) 
Note that these two equations generate Equation (A12) and Equation (A13). 
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Lastly, the probability limit of the return to foreign education is given in 
Equation (A14). 
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D. Classical Measurement Error in Investment in Domestic Education 
In this case, there is classical measurement error for both total education and 
for domestic education.  The econometric specification consists of Equation (A15), 
and the classical measurement error for domestic education and foreign education are 
given in Equation (A16) and Equation (A17), respectively. 
ξφφ ++= *10
*
fd EE  (A15) 
ddd EE θ+=
*
 (A16) 
( ) ( )ddTf ETE θθ +−+= **  (A17) 
Thus, the probability limit of the coefficient on foreign education is: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )dd
d
dd
d
dd
ddd
dd
ddddT
d
df
EE
E
E
EET
E
EET
E
EE
p
θ
θ
θ
τ
θ
θ
θ
θθθ
φ
varvar
var
varvar
var
varvar
var,cov
var
,cov
var
,covˆlim
1
*
**
1
+
−
+
=
+
−−
=
+
+−−+
=
=
 (A18) 
E. Classical Measurement Error in the Wage Specification 
Assume that the classical measurement error for foreign education is that in 
Equation (A17).  Then the regression consists of Equation (A19), and the probability 
limit of the return to foreign education is shown in Equation (A20). 
( ) εθθϕϕ +−−++= 1210 dETY  (A19) 
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CHAPTER 3 
DO COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS REALLY MEASURE THE QUALITY OF 
FOREIGN SCHOOLS? 
I. Introduction 
Does school quality cause greater wages in the labor market?  Previous studies 
that use educational expenditure and class size as proxies for United States school 
quality have yet to reach a consensus.  On the one hand, Card and Krueger (1992) 
present evidence that the two measures are positively associated with the return to 
education at the state level.  On the other hand, individual-level studies show that the 
return to education does not vary with the educational expenditure and class size of the 
school or district actually attended by the individual (Julian R. Betts 1996; Jeff 
Grogger 1996). 
In contrast, recent studies of the return to foreign education among immigrants 
have been consistent in concluding that it varies with the quality of foreign schools.  
Individual-level wage regressions show that the return to foreign education increases 
with educational expenditures and student-teacher ratios at the country level (Julian R. 
Betts and Magnus Lofstrom 2000; Bernt Bratsberg and James F. Jr Ragan 2002).  
Similarly, two-step estimators show that the return to foreign education across 
countries varies with these two measures (Bernt Bratsberg and Dek Terrell 2002). 
A potential problem in the foreign school quality literature is the presence of 
country-level “cultural” unobservables that are correlated with school quality and 
wages, which may lead to spurious estimates of the return to the quality of foreign 
education.  This problem is an example of Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor’s (1996) 
critique that aggregate-level unobservables affect the interpretation of aggregate-level 
proxies of school quality.  When comparing immigrants across countries, cultural 
unobservables may take the form of early health outcomes that are associated with 
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educational expenditures but also independently raise the return to foreign education.  
Alternatively, they may be an artifact of selective migration, in which the average 
school quality in the country is not the average school quality among people who 
actually come to the United States.  Cultural unobservables are more problematic here 
than in studies of domestic schools if the differences in unobservables between 
countries are greater than the differences in within each country. 
In this paper, I test the extent to which educational expenditures as a share of 
GDP per capita and student-teacher ratios at the country level can be interpreted as 
measures of foreign school quality.  I also examine whether math and science student 
achievement test scores at the country level, defined as labor force quality by 
Hanushek and Kimko (2000), can be viewed as a proxy of school quality.  My 
identification strategy compares the effect of these measures on immigrants who 
arrived as adults with immigrants who arrived as children.  The three measures 
encompass both school quality and cultural unobservables in the first group, but they 
only reflect cultural unobservables in the second group because these immigrants 
never actually attended school in their countries of birth.  This test formalizes 
Hanushek and Kimko’s (2000) comparison of the effect of labor force quality on 
immigrants with and without United States education.  It is similar in spirit to 
Bleakley and Chin (2004) who use of age at arrival and country of origin to identify 
variation in English language skills. 
Using data from the 2000 Census and the 2005 American Community Survey, 
I confirm the results of previous studies by showing that the return to foreign 
education is associated with the three potential measures of foreign school quality in 
the expected directions.  However, the results persist only for educational expenditures 
once I properly account for the country-level correlation of the wage residuals.  The 
falsification tests using child-arriving immigrants show even stronger effects of the 
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three potential measures of foreign school quality, which suggests that they also reflect 
cultural unobservables.  Triple difference specifications that separately identify the 
effects of foreign school quality and cultural unobservables show that all three of the 
country characteristics are measures of cultural unobservables more than foreign 
school quality. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  In Section II, I discuss the 
literature on the returns to school quality, and in section III, I describe the data and 
identification strategy.  Section IV presents the empirical results, and section VI 
concludes. 
II. Literature Review 
Variation in the quality of educational institutions may generate heterogeneity 
in the return to education (Jere R. Behrman and Nancy Birdsall 1983).  An ideal 
research design to test this hypothesis is to randomly assign children to schools and 
estimate school quality as the school’s value-added contribution to student outcomes.  
Then, the causal effect of school quality is estimated by regressing subsequent labor 
market outcomes on school quality.  Because school fixed-effects estimates from 
value-added models are usually unavailable, scholars typically use school, district, or 
state characteristics – such as student-teacher ratios and expenditures per pupil – as 
inputs in education production functions that predict school quality.  However, there 
continues to be substantial disagreement on whether these measures are actually valid 
proxies of school quality (for a review, see Eric A. Hanushek 1986). 
The literature on immigrant labor market outcomes has addressed differences 
in foreign school quality since Chiswick’s (1978) seminal article on the return to 
foreign and domestic education.  Subsequent articles have taken advantage of data 
improvements to show that the return to foreign education varies by country of origin 
and that on average it is less than the return to domestic education among natives (e.g. 
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Rachel M. Friedberg 2000; Albert Yung-Hsu Liu 2009).  Scholars commonly argue 
that the difference in the returns is due the production of country-specific knowledge 
by foreign schools, which makes education not entirely portable between countries. 
To study the source of the variation in the return to foreign education, scholars 
have turned to country-level educational inputs as potential measures of school 
quality.  Individual-level wage regressions show statistically significant interactions 
between the return to schooling and (1) expenditure per pupil as a share of GDP per 
capita and (2) student-teacher ratios (Julian R. Betts and Magnus Lofstrom 2000; 
Bernt Bratsberg and James F. Jr Ragan 2002).  These studies either estimate naïve 
ordinary least squares regressions or account for the correlation of wages within 
country with a random effects specification.  An alternative econometric strategy is a 
two-step estimator that estimates the return to education for each country and then 
regresses the returns on country characteristics, similar to Card and Krueger’s (1992) 
study of United States school quality at the state level and Borjas’ (1987) study of 
selective migration across countries.  In this case, Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) show 
that the return to foreign education increases with (1) expenditure per pupil as a share 
of GDP per capita and (2) student-teacher ratios. 
While these studies demonstrate that the return to foreign education varies with 
the potential measures of school quality, they are subject to at least three limitations.  
First, previous studies typically do not correctly account for the correlation of wages 
within countries.  Using aggregate measures on micro-level data leads to inflated t-
statistics in ordinary least squares specifications (Brent R. Moulton 1990).  While 
some studies account for this problem with country random effects, any correlation 
between the random country-level intercepts and the control variables would lead to 
inconsistent estimators. 
Second, there are likely to be cultural unobservables that vary between 
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countries, which independently lead to greater returns to education.  These 
unobservables fall into one of two categories.  The first are unobserved characteristics 
shared among all people from a source country, such as the perceived value of 
education or the match between the curriculum of foreign schools and the demands of 
the United States labor market.  The second class consists of characteristics shared 
among immigrants from a country that choose to migrate.  Cultural unobservables that 
are correlated with the potential measures of school quality and with wages will lead 
to spurious effects on the return to foreign education.  This problem has been shown to 
affect the interpretation of state-level studies of school quality and returns to education 
in the United States (Eric A. Hanushek, Steven G. Rivkin and Lori L. Taylor 1996). 
A third limitation is that student-teacher ratios and expenditures per pupil may 
not be valid predictors of school quality.  Indeed, Hanushek (1986) argues that the 
literature does not reveal an empirical relationship between class size and expenditures 
per pupil with student achievement in United States public schools.  A relatively new 
approach is to use student outcomes as an alternative measure of school quality.  In the 
domestic education literature, Murphy and Peltzman (2004) relate state average AFQT 
test scores with state-level earnings.  In the foreign education literature, Hanushek and 
Kimko (2000) develop a measure of labor force quality based on internationally 
comparable math and science test scores.  Under the assumption of stationary school 
quality, the authors take the average scores of tests administered by the International 
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement and the International 
Assessment of Education Progress.  Countries who do not give the test to their 
students are assigned values based on country-level education production functions.  
The authors then argue that country-level labor force quality is associated with greater 
earnings among immigrants and thus reflects labor market productivity. 
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III. Data and Research Design 
A. Data 
In this paper, I test whether the return to foreign education varies with 
educational expenditure as a share of GDP, student-teacher ratio, and labor force 
quality by linking individual-level data on immigrants and natives in the United States 
with country-level data.  I draw the individual-level data from the 2000 5 percent 
sample United States Census and the 2005 1 percent ACS public use microdata 
samples.  To make the sample sizes manageable, I take an additional 1/10 subsample 
of all-white native households in the Census and a 1/2 subsample of all-white native 
households in the American Community Survey and reweight the observations 
accordingly.  The datasets contain information on total education and wages, as well 
as demographic controls such as country of birth and year of arrival.  I restrict the 
regression sample to men to abstract from selective labor force participation among 
women.  I also exclude respondents who are living in group quarters.  I apply a 
consistent top code set as the minimum top code in the Census and the ACS in 2000 
dollars, and then impute wages as 1.4 times the new top code.  I divide annual wages 
and salary by usual work hours and weeks worked to get an estimate of hourly wages.  
Lastly, I limit the sample to respondents who worked last year in the wage and salary 
sector and earned between 1 and 100 dollars in 2000 dollars. 
Country characteristics data comes from several different sources.  Most 
country characteristics are taken from Blau, Kahn, and Papps (2008), with some minor 
modifications.  The percent refugee data is annual rather than calculated at five year 
intervals.  Student-teacher ratios from Barro and Lee (1994) and the World Bank 
Development Indicators (2005) and data on primary expenditures as a fraction of GDP 
per capita from the Work Bank Development Indicators.  I use the labor force quality 
variable (QL2*) provided in the appendix of Hanushek and Kimko (2000).
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Table 18. Sample Means and Standard Deviations by Age at Arrival Cohort 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 Adult Child   Adult Child 
ln(Hourly  2.597 2.838  Arrived 1961– 0.019 0.322 
wage) (0.717) (0.625)  1970 (0.137) (0.467) 
Hourly wage 17.356 20.499  Arrived 1971– 0.105 0.348 
 (13.265) (12.479)  1980 (0.307) (0.476) 
Labor hours per  42.786 44.242  Arrived 1981– 0.259 0.054 
week (9.832) (10.266)  1990 (0.438) (0.225) 
Education 12.096 13.719  Arrived 1991– 0.456 0.000 
 (4.805) (2.685)  2000 (0.498) (0.000) 
White 0.276 0.538  Arrived 2001– 0.161 0.000 
 (0.447) (0.499)  2005 (0.367) (0.000) 
Black 0.051 0.034  GDP per capita  5.342 6.203 
 (0.220) (0.182)  in 1000s (6.720) (4.833) 
Hispanic 0.305 0.204  Student-teacher  29.809 31.921 
 (0.460) (0.403)  ratio (8.961) (10.360) 
Asian or Pacific  0.276 0.132  Education exp.  11.663 11.637 
Islander (0.447) (0.338)  ratio (5.473) (5.607) 
Other race 0.092 0.092  English  0.095 0.139 
 (0.289) (0.289)  speaking  (0.294) (0.346) 
Potential total  25.536 18.596  Other English  0.132 0.062 
work exp. (10.952) (9.425)   (0.338) (0.242) 
Years since  10.809 35.869  Non English  0.773 0.799 
migration (8.344) (9.523)   (0.419) (0.401) 
Age 43.632 38.315  Labor force  0.397 0.458 
 (9.596) (9.240)  quality 1 (0.115) (0.109) 
Arrived 1900– 0.000 0.056  Labor force  0.428 0.473 
1950 (0.000) (0.230)  quality 2 (0.136) (0.112) 
Arrived 1951– 0.000 0.221  N 145707 41007 
1960 (0.000) (0.415)     
Sources: 2000 U.S. Census 5 percent sample and 2005 American Community 
Survey. 
Notes: The sample consists of men, between ages 25 and 64 years old, born in 
countries with valid source country characteristics, and in the wage and salary 
sector with hourly wage between $1 and $100 in 2000 dollars.  The age at arrival 
for adult arriving immigrants is at least 25 years old, and the age at arrival for 
child arriving immigrants is less than seven years old. 
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I divide the immigrant sample into three cohorts based on age at arrival.  The 
adult-arriving cohort consists of immigrants whose age at arrival is at least 25 years 
old.  Previous studies decompose education by its country of origin using the 
piecewise function of total education and age at arrival presented in Equation (16).  
The function implies that all education of the adult-arriving cohort was earned abroad.  
For a discussion of the measurement error associated with this approach, see Liu 
(2009).  The second cohort consists of child-arriving immigrants whose age at arrival 
is less than seven years old.  The piecewise function assumes that the education of 
these immigrants was earned only in the United States.  The remaining immigrants in 
the adolescent-arriving cohort are educated partially in the United States and partially 
in their countries of birth.  I exclude this group of immigrants from the sample since it 
is impossible to know how much foreign education they would have earned had they 
not migrated to the United States. 
I present the sample means and standard deviations by age at arrival cohort in 
Table 18.  The average hourly wage among adult-arriving immigrants in the sample is 
17.4 dollars in 2000 dollars and the average labor supply is full-time.  The average 
grade completed is 12.1 years, which I assume is all of foreign origin.  The average 
years since migration is 10.8 years, which is measured with less error than in previous 
studies because the 2000 Census and the American Community Survey have 
immigrants report their year of arrival in years rather than in year intervals as was 
done in previous Censuses. 
The sample statistics for the child-arriving cohort show some important 
differences.  The average wage of this group is 20.5 dollars, which is larger than the 
average wage among adult-arriving immigrants.  While their average labor supply is 
similar, child-arriving immigrants have almost two additional years of education.  
Based on the piecewise function to decompose education by its country of origin, total 
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education for these immigrants is all earned in the United States since they migrated 
before they were seven years old.  In addition, child-arriving immigrants come from 
earlier year of arrival cohorts on average since the sample is restricted to consist of 
immigrants between ages 25 and 64. 
 
Figure 6. Country-Level Education among Adult-Arriving Immigrants 
The country characteristics for the two groups show that child-arriving 
immigrants are more likely to come from countries with greater potential measures of 
school quality.  The GDP per capita for adult-arriving immigrants is 5,300 dollars 
compared to 6,200 dollars for child-arriving immigrants.  The average primary 
education expenditures per pupil as a share of GDP per capita and student-teacher 
ratio are roughly the same for both groups.  Lastly, the labor force quality measure 
developed by Hanushek and Kimko (2000) is higher among the child-arriving 
immigrants than the adult-arriving immigrants.  These differences are likely due to the 
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shift in the distribution of source countries from Europe to Asia and Latin America 
over the latter half of the twentieth century. 
 
Figure 7. Country-Level Primary Education Expenditure Ratio-Adjusted Education 
and Wages among Adult-Arriving Immigrants 
How do immigrant wages vary with the source country characteristics?  I first 
present local linear regressions of country-average wages and country-average 
education in Figure 6 for the adult-arriving cohort.  The scatter plot reveals substantial 
variation in average educational attainment, ranging from Mexico with about 8 years 
of education to India with almost 16 years of education.  The slope of the line is 
generally positive, which suggests that the return to foreign education is positive. 
The following three figures show the non-parametric relationship between 
wages and education after adjusting for potential measures of school quality.  In 
Figure 7, the x-axis is the product of education and the primary education expenditure 
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ratio.  There continues to be variation across countries for both wages and adjusted 
education, and the overall trend is positive.  Figure 8 presents similar estimates after 
adjusting education by the natural log of the student-teacher ratio.  The prior is a 
negative relationship since smaller class sizes are expected to provide students with 
greater student achievement.  While the local linear regression does not have a 
consistent slope, it is generally positive, which goes against the prior.  Lastly, Figure 9 
shows the relationship between wages and education with a labor force quality 
adjustment.  Again, the general relationship is positive, although the slope would be 
steeper if not for the presence of India as an outlier. 
 
Figure 8. Country-Level Student-Teacher Ratio-Adjusted Education and Wages 
among Adult-Arriving Immigrants 
The four figures provide preliminary evidence that the return to education 
could increase with the primary education expenditure ratio and with labor force 
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quality.  Surprisingly, I show that it increases with the natural log of class size, when 
we typically expect smaller classes to be associated with greater school quality.  
However, since the specifications do not control for other important variables – both 
observable and unobservable – that vary among immigrants, I turn next to parametric 
analyses to hold these factors constant. 
 
Figure 9. Country-Level Labor Force Quality-Adjusted Education and Wages among 
Adult-Arriving Immigrants 
B. Research Design 
The parametric research design is based on the standard regression of wages on 
education, school quality, the interaction between education and school quality with a 
set of exogenous control variables.  For a discussion of the human capital models that 
rationalize this specification, see Heckman, Layne-Farrar, and Todd (1996).  Equation 
(17) shows the baseline specification for individual i  who was born in country c , in 
cultural group g , and resides in state s .  I include years since migration and age at 
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arrival as exogenous control variables in icgstX .  Because labor force quality and 
primary education expenditure ratios are time-invariant, I cannot use a country fixed 
effects specification.  Instead, I account for the correlation between the wage residuals 
at the country level by clustering the standard errors.  Estimating a naïve specification 
with ordinary least squares will lead to downward biased standard errors and generate 
inappropriate inferences.  To account for other common cultural unobservables 
between respondents, I include race fixed effects as a rough proxy.  I will also 
experiment with using source country language and region of the world fixed effects 
as alternative ways of holding culture constant. 
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As discussed above, the primary concern with this approach is that there are 
unobservables that vary by country and are correlated with school quality.  Thus, I use 
the alternative specification presented in Equation (18) – the identification of the 
return to quality of education comes from variation across countries within cultural 
groups.  I use first generation immigrants with younger ages at arrival as a 
counterfactual in that they should not be affected by school quality per say.  4δ  yields 
the common effect of potential school quality measure on wages, which reflects the 
effect of cultural unobservables.  6δ  indicates how the potential school quality 
measure affects the wage intercept for the adult-arriving immigrants, and lastly, 7δ  
indicates the effect of the potential school quality measure on the return to education 
after removing the cultural unobservables. 
A second approach is to use the two-step estimator by regressing first stage 
coefficients on aggregate characteristics (George J. Borjas 1987; Bernt Bratsberg and 
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Dek Terrell 2002; David Card and Alan B. Krueger 1992).  The approach here is to 
separately estimate the return to education by age at arrival cohort and country.  
Separate regressions lead to a more flexible functional form than joint specifications 
that impose common effects of demographic characteristics on wages.  I then take the 
coefficients on the return to education and regress them on the potential school quality 
measures, either with adult immigrants by themselves or with both age at arrival 
cohorts with interactions between the age at arrival cohort and the potential measures.  
Each country is weighted by the number of observations in the first step.  Note that the 
latter specification is an improvement over previous studies because it differences out 
common cultural unobservables at the country level.  This analysis will be completed 
in the future. 
IV. Preliminary Empirical Results 
Table 19 presents the wage regressions for the adult cohort, which matches the 
usual specification in previous studies.  Since quality can either raises wages overall or 
for each additional year in school, I estimate models with and without the interaction 
between the potential measures of school quality and education.  Column (1) presents 
the results for primary educational expenditure per pupil as a share of GDP per capita 
only.  The return to foreign education is 5.7 percent, which is similar to previous 
estimates using other datasets.  The return to the educational expenditure ratio is 
0.724.  The bracketed term in the table shows the standard error without correcting for 
arbitrary correlations within each country and indicates that the potential measure is 
associated with greater wages at a statistically significant level.  In contrast, one I 
cluster the standard error at the country level, the coefficient estimate loses its 
precision and is no longer statistically significant. 
In column (2), I repeat the specification but include the interaction between 
education and the primary education expenditure ratio.  In this case, the interaction is 
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positive even after clustering the standard errors, which implies that the return to 
foreign education is greater among immigrants from countries that devote a higher 
share of their GDP per capita toward primary education.  The remaining control 
variables are of the expected direction, with black, Hispanic, and other race 
immigrants earning less than white and Asian Pacific Islander immigrants.  The return 
to an additional year in the United States is 1.8 percent, although this estimate is 
biased upward due to emigration bias (Darren Lubotsky 2007). 
Columns (3) and (4) estimate the model that tests for the effect of the natural 
log student-teacher ratios.  The sign of the quality measure without an interaction is 
negative in the naïve specification, which suggests that immigrants from countries 
with larger class sizes have lower wages.   The interaction term in column (4) shows 
that this decrease grows in absolute value with each additional year in the United 
States.  However, once I correct the standard errors, the estimates lose their precision 
and are no longer statistically significant. 
The third set of results presents new evidence on the return to labor force 
quality among adult-arriving immigrants.  The model includes a broader set of control 
variables than the specifications in Hanushek and Kimko (2000).  Column (5) shows 
that labor force quality is positively associated with wages, both overall and with each 
additional year of education.  However, as with the class size estimates, the results are 
no longer statistically significant once I cluster the standard errors at the country level. 
The final set of results combines the three potential measures of school quality 
into a single specification.  Column (8) shows that the return to foreign education is 
greater among immigrants from countries with greater educational expenditure ratios, 
even after clustering the standard errors.  The other two potential measures are not 
robust to this correction, which suggests that only the educational expenditure ratio is 
possibly a meaningful measure of school quality. 
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Table 19. Variation in the Return to Education among Adult-Arriving Immigrants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Education 0.057*** 0.035*** 0.057*** 0.106** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.051) 
  [0.000]††† [0.001]††† [0.000]††† [0.004]††† 
Primary education expenditure 0.724 -1.910***   
ratio (0.644) (0.643)   
  [0.040]††† [0.098]†††   
Education*Primary education  0.205***   
expenditure  (0.040)   
 ratio  [0.007]†††   
ln(Student-teacher ratio)   -0.126 0.062 
   (0.128) (0.201) 
    [0.007]††† [0.017]††† 
Education*ln(Student-teacher    -0.014 
ratio)    (0.017) 
     [0.001]††† 
Labor force quality     
     
     
Education*Labor force quality     
     
     
Years since migration 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  [0.001]††† [0.001]††† [0.001]††† [0.001]††† 
Age at arrival -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  [0.000]††† [0.000]††† [0.000]††† [0.000]††† 
N 145707 145707 145707 145707 
R-squared 0.272 0.276 0.272 0.273 
Sources: 2000 U.S. Census 5 percent sample and 2005 American Community 
Survey. 
Notes: † p<.10, †† p<.05, ††† p<.01.  The sample consists of men, between ages 25 
and 64 years old, born in countries with valid source country characteristics, and in 
the wage and salary sector with hourly wage between $1 and $100 in 2000 dollars.  
The age at arrival for adult arriving immigrants is at least 25 years old, and the age 
at arrival for child arriving immigrants is less than seven years old.  All 
specifications also control for race, cohort, and year fixed effects. 
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Table 19 (Continued). 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Education 0.058*** 0.031 0.056*** -0.030 
 (0.011) (0.030) (0.011) (0.060) 
  [0.000]††† [0.001]††† [0.000]††† [0.006]††† 
Primary education expenditure    0.592 -2.335** 
ratio   (0.663) (0.987) 
    [0.045]††† [0.122]††† 
Education*Primary education     0.227*** 
expenditure ratio    (0.081) 
     [0.009]††† 
ln(Student-teacher ratio)   -0.123 -0.305 
   (0.133) (0.247) 
    [0.008]††† [0.022]††† 
Education*ln(Student-teacher     0.012 
ratio)    (0.015) 
     [0.002]††† 
Labor force quality 0.037 -0.882 -0.143 -0.943 
 (0.288) (0.627) (0.326) (0.602) 
  [0.013]††† [0.044]††† [0.015]††† [0.046]††† 
Education*Labor force quality  0.065  0.052 
  (0.055)  (0.051) 
   [0.003]†††  [0.003]††† 
Years since migration 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
  [0.001]††† [0.001]††† [0.001]††† [0.001]††† 
Age at arrival -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
  [0.000]††† [0.000]††† [0.000]††† [0.000]††† 
N 145707 145707 145707 145707 
R-squared 0.270 0.273 0.273 0.280 
Sources: 2000 U.S. Census 5 percent sample and 2005 American Community 
Survey. 
Notes: † p<.10, †† p<.05, ††† p<.01.  The sample consists of men, between ages 25 
and 64 years old, born in countries with valid source country characteristics, and in 
the wage and salary sector with hourly wage between $1 and $100 in 2000 dollars.  
The age at arrival for adult arriving immigrants is at least 25 years old, and the age 
at arrival for child arriving immigrants is less than seven years old.  All 
specifications also control for race, cohort, and year fixed effects. 
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Table 20. Variation in the Return to Education among Child-Arriving Immigrants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Education 0.081*** 0.067*** 0.081*** 0.141*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.030) 
  [0.001]††† [0.002]††† [0.001]††† [0.010]††† 
Primary education expenditure  0.122 -1.746**   
ratio (0.290) (0.822)   
  [0.080] [0.276]†††   
Education*Primary education   0.133**   
expenditure ratio  (0.050)   
   [0.019]†††   
ln(Student-teacher ratio)   0.029 0.274** 
   (0.019) (0.123) 
    [0.009]††† [0.042]††† 
Education*ln(Student-teacher     -0.018* 
ratio)    (0.009) 
     [0.003]††† 
Labor force quality     
     
      
Education*Labor force quality     
     
      
Years since migration 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  [0.001]††† [0.001]††† [0.001]††† [0.001]††† 
Age at arrival 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  [0.001]††† [0.001]††† [0.001]††† [0.001]††† 
N 41007 41007 41007 41007 
R-squared 0.212 0.213 0.212 0.213 
Sources: 2000 U.S. Census 5 percent sample and 2005 American Community 
Survey. 
Notes: † p<.10, †† p<.05, ††† p<.01.  The sample consists of men, between ages 25 
and 64 years old, born in countries with valid source country characteristics, and in 
the wage and salary sector with hourly wage between $1 and $100 in 2000 dollars.  
The age at arrival for adult arriving immigrants is at least 25 years old, and the age 
at arrival for child arriving immigrants is less than seven years old.  All 
specifications also control for race, cohort, and year fixed effects. 
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Table 20 (Continued). 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Education 0.081*** 0.050*** 0.081*** 0.079* 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.043) 
  [0.001]††† [0.005]††† [0.001]††† [0.014]††† 
Primary education expenditure    0.118 -0.769 
ratio   (0.305) (1.193) 
    [0.084] [0.350]†† 
Education*Primary education     0.065 
expenditure ratio    (0.070) 
     [0.024]††† 
ln(Student-teacher ratio)   0.037* 0.139 
   (0.021) (0.147) 
    [0.010]††† [0.050]††† 
Education*ln(Student-teacher     -0.007 
ratio)    (0.010) 
     [0.004]†† 
Labor force quality 0.117 -0.866** 0.121 -0.543* 
 (0.073) (0.349) (0.073) (0.314) 
  [0.028]††† [0.143]††† [0.029]††† [0.160]††† 
Education*Labor force quality  0.068**  0.045* 
  (0.026)  (0.023) 
   [0.010]†††  [0.011]††† 
Years since migration 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  [0.001]††† [0.001]††† [0.001]††† [0.001]††† 
Age at arrival 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  [0.001]††† [0.001]††† [0.001]††† [0.001]††† 
N 41007 41007 41007 41007 
R-squared 0.212 0.213 0.213 0.214 
Sources: 2000 U.S. Census 5 percent sample and 2005 American Community 
Survey. 
Notes: † p<.10, †† p<.05, ††† p<.01.  The sample consists of men, between ages 25 
and 64 years old, born in countries with valid source country characteristics, and in 
the wage and salary sector with hourly wage between $1 and $100 in 2000 dollars.  
The age at arrival for adult arriving immigrants is at least 25 years old, and the age 
at arrival for child arriving immigrants is less than seven years old.  All 
specifications also control for race, cohort, and year fixed effects. 
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Table 21. Triple Difference Estimates of Potential Measures of School Quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Education 0.078*** 0.059*** 0.076*** 0.159*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.038) 
Adult cohort 0.425*** 0.433*** 1.177** 1.660** 
 (0.075) (0.078) (0.487) (0.795) 
Education*Adult cohort -0.020*** -0.023** -0.018*** -0.052 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.057) 
Primary education expenditure ratio -0.413 -2.794***   
 (0.439) (1.018)   
Adult cohort*Primary education  1.174* 0.888   
expenditure ratio (0.694) (0.823)   
Education*Primary education   0.174***   
expenditure ratio  (0.056)   
Education*Adult cohort* Primary    0.032   
education expenditure ratio  (0.053)   
ln(Student-teacher ratio)   0.058 0.385* 
   (0.050) (0.196) 
Adult cohort*ln(Student-teacher ratio)   -0.192 -0.329 
   (0.143) (0.227) 
Education*ln(Student-teacher ratio)    -0.024* 
    (0.012) 
Education*Adult cohort*ln(Student-    0.010 
teacher ratio)    (0.017) 
Labor force quality     
     
Adult cohort*Labor force quality     
     
Education*Labor force quality     
     
Education*Adult cohort* Labor force      
quality     
N 186714 186714 186714 186714 
R-squared 0.274 0.278 0.274 0.275 
Sources: 2000 U.S. Census 5 percent sample and 2005 American Community Survey. 
Notes: See Table 19 and Table 20. 
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Table 21 (Continued). 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Education 0.077*** 0.028 0.059*** 0.052*** 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) 
Adult cohort 0.419** 0.092 0.830 1.854* 
 (0.157) (0.272) (0.497) (0.978) 
Education*Adult cohort -0.017*** 0.005  -0.082 
 (0.006) (0.023)  (0.058) 
Primary education expenditure ratio   -0.007 -2.832*** 
   (0.438) (0.993) 
Adult cohort*Primary education    0.548 0.473 
expenditure ratio   (0.522) (1.006) 
Education*Primary education     0.190*** 
expenditure ratio    (0.051) 
Education*Adult cohort* Primary      0.038 
education expenditure ratio    (0.077) 
ln(Student-teacher ratio)   0.038  
   (0.033)  
Adult cohort*ln(Student-teacher ratio)   -0.157 -0.302 
   (0.131) (0.243) 
Education*ln(Student-teacher ratio)    0.001 
    (0.002) 
Education*Adult cohort*ln(Student-    0.011 
teacher ratio)    (0.015) 
Labor force quality -0.113 -1.653** 0.039  
 (0.170) (0.657) (0.117)  
Adult cohort*Labor force quality 0.176 0.814 -0.163 -0.868 
 (0.312) (0.657) (0.250) (0.584) 
Education*Labor force quality  0.107***  -0.001 
  (0.037)  (0.007) 
Education*Adult cohort* Labor force   -0.043  0.050 
quality  (0.050)  (0.050) 
N 186714 186714 186714 186714 
R-squared 0.272 0.275 0.274 0.281 
Sources: 2000 U.S. Census 5 percent sample and 2005 American Community Survey. 
Notes: See Table 19 and Table 20. 
As a falsification test, I re-run the previous analysis on immigrants in the child-
arriving cohort.  Note that these children are educated in the United States and should 
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not be affected by school quality.  The potential measures of school quality should 
only affect wages to the extent that they reflect cultural unobservables shared by all 
people born in the same country.  Table 20 shows that the return to education 
increases with the education expenditure ratio even after clustering standard errors by 
country.  These results suggest that the measure partially reflects cultural 
unobservables that are correlated with school quality and also with wages.  It is 
promising though, that the size of the coefficient is 0.133, which is less than the 
corresponding coefficient for the adult-arriving cohort at 0.205.  Under the 
assumptions of the identification strategy, the difference between these two estimates 
is the effect of school quality as measured by the educational expenditure ratio on the 
return to education. 
The tests for class size and labor force quality reject both as meaningful 
measures of school quality.  Class size has a negative effect on the return to education 
that is marginally statistically significant, which suggests that it reflects cultural 
unobservables.  Note that the difference between the adult-arriving and child-arriving 
cohorts is actually positive, which would suggest that larger class sizes are associated 
with greater wages in the United States labor market.  Columns (5) and (6) repeat the 
exercise for labor force quality, and again, the relationship between the potential 
measure of school quality and wages is stronger for immigrants who never went to 
those schools than immigrants who actually did.  The fully specified model in Column 
(8) includes all potential measures and shows that the educational expenditure ratio 
and class size are not correlated with wages, but labor force quality is. 
The final step is to estimate the triple difference specifications to separately 
identify the effect of shared cultural unobservables and the residual effect of school 
quality on the return to education.  Overall, the results in Table 21 do not support any 
of the three country characteristics as meaningful measures of school quality.  In 
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column (2), the education expenditure ratio is positively associated with an additional 
year of education for both immigrants who attended school abroad and immigrants 
who only attended school in the United States.  This suggests that the measure should 
be interpreted as cultural unobservables that are associated with the return to education 
are not measures of school quality.  Note that the interaction of education and the 
cohort dummy variable shows that the return to foreign education is less than the 
return to domestic education.  The results for class size and labor force yield are 
similar, with each of the two potential measures affecting both cohorts equally. 
V. Conclusion 
What happens to the relationship between potential measures of school quality 
and the return to foreign education after removing the independent effect of cultural 
unobservables?  The results in this paper suggest that primary educational expenditure 
per pupil as a share of GDP per capita, student-teacher ratios, and labor force quality 
do not measure the effect of school quality.  Rather, they reflect cultural unobservables 
that are correlated with these both these measures and with wages in the United States.  
Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor (1996) who warn against using state-level 
characteristics as measures of local school quality.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, this 
critique applies to country-level characteristics as measures of foreign school quality 
as well. 
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